Epstein Secrets

nter at a mall in Riyadh, 21-year Abdul Rahman Saeed -- like Nada, a Saudi in a national labor market overwhelmed by the flood of cheap labor from South Asia -- sells mobile phones. In between chats with customers about phone accessories, he despairs of ever pulling a job with enough salary to many the l

grams missed their objectives. Gulf countries have long tried to absorb their national workers into the public sector instead. The result in Saudi Arabia is that about 80 percent of all working Saudis have government jobs, but more than 80 percent of private-sector jobs are held by foreigners. Foreig

nter at a mall in Riyadh, 21-year Abdul Rahman Saeed -- like Nada, a Saudi in a national labor market overwhelmed by the flood of cheap labor from South Asia -- sells mobile phones. In between chats with customers about phone accessories, he despairs of ever pulling a job with enough salary to marry the

grams missed their objectives. Gulf countries have long tried to absorb their national workers into the public sector instead. The result in Saudi Arabia is that about 80 percent of all working Saudis have government jobs, but more than 80 percent of private-sector jobs are held by foreigners. Foreig

ces south to invade Kuwait. So if it's conventional wisdom that the United States will not, or should not, intervene militarily in the Middle East or South Asia after it draws down forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, it's also likely dead wrong. What is true, however, is that political and military trajectories i

were essential for crisis management in the Cold War strategic relationship after the Cuban missile crisis. Meanwhile, the Gulf states, led by Saudi Arabia, are likely to look for their own nuclear deterrents. Much like France wanted its own nuclear force de frappe during the Cold War, the Gulf states wi

ces south to invade Kuwait. So if it's conventional wisdom that the United States will not, or should not, intervene militarily in the Middle East or South Asia after it draws down forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, it's also likely dead wrong. What is true, however, is that political and military trajectories i

were essential for crisis management in the Cold War strategic relationship after the Cuban missile crisis. Meanwhile, the Gulf states, led by Saudi Arabia, are likely to look for their own nuclear deterrents. Much like France wanted its own nuclear force de frappe during the Cold War, the Gulf states wi