Epstein Secrets

f its transitions and the ease with which the survival game may be embedded within it, we base our model on the haploid population-genetic model of Moran (1958).The standard version of the Moran model pairs single births and deaths such that the population size remains constant. In the absence of se

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weak selection (as opposed to 6 cc 1) shall become clear at the end of this section. The dynamics of the system is given by the frequency dependent Moran process. In each time step a randomly chosen individual is replaced by a copy of an individual chosen with probability proportional to its payoff.

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