Epstein Secrets

th Cir. 2006) 11 United States v. McElvain, 272 U.S. 633 (1926) 15 United States v. Miller, 911 F.3d 638 (1st Cir. 2018) 10 United States v. Mogan, 393 F.3d 192 (D.C. Cir. 2004) 13, 14 United States v. Napolitano, 761 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1985) 8 United States v. Pierre-Louis, 2018 WL 40431

legislative history at issue did not clearly evidence Congress' intent regarding retroactivity. Id. That is not the case here. As Judge Katzman of the Second Circuit has recognized, unambiguous legislative history should not be disregarded: When courts construe statutes in ways that respect what legislators cons

tion to the FSIA applies to negate the Kingdom's immunity. "[S]overeign immunity under the FSIA is immunity from suit, not just from liabili- ty." Moran a Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 27 F.3d 169, 172 (5th Cir.1994). Because there were no factual disputes raised in the Court's resolution of this motion

0 (hereinafter "Supp. Al-Wohai- bi Aff."). a. Status of the PIF In Filler v. Hanvit Bank, a case with facts very similar to those presented here, the Second Circuit reiterated Dole Food's requirement of direct ownership for instru- mentality status. Two defendants were commercial banks majority-owned by the Ko

t of the Princes’ ac- tions. [22-24] Pursuant to the Second Cir- cuit’s instruction, the Court must first de- termine whe

very least, discovery should be ordered circumspectly and only to verify allega- tions of specific facts crucial to an immuni- ty determination.”)). The Second Circuit has instructed “that generally a plaintiff may be allowed limited discovery with re- spect to the jurisdictional issue; but until [plaintiff] has sho

ception to the FSIA applies to negate the Kingdom’s immunity. “[Slovereion immunity under the FSIA is immunity from suit, not just from liabili- ty.” Moran v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 27 F.3d 169, 172 th Cir.1994). Because there were no factual disputes raised in the Court’s resolution of this motion, no