Epstein Secrets

ting did not occur until late November, it had been initially proposed in mid-October 1999. This meeting had the predictable and intended result of Morgan Stanley's notifying Computer Associates ("CA") management of Sam Wyly's receptiveness to a potential acquisition. This, in turn, led to an overture by Sanjay

& Walker to Jones 13ay. The Wylys also moved the hulk of their fainilies' legal work from Jackson & Walker to Jones Day. As a result of the change, Jones Day became responsible for preparing and filing all of Michael? and Sterling Software's SEC filings, including their Form 10-Ks and their proxy stateme

wnership. 106. In late 1995, French terminated his relationship with Jackson & Walker and entered into a consulting agreement with the law firm of Jones Day, which compensated French based on the business he brought to the Finn. Michaels and Sterling Software followed French and changed their primary ou

tion to the FSIA applies to negate the Kingdom's immunity. "[S]overeign immunity under the FSIA is immunity from suit, not just from liabili- ty." Moran a Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 27 F.3d 169, 172 (5th Cir.1994). Because there were no factual disputes raised in the Court's resolution of this motion

umaker, Jona- than Chapman Rose, Melissa Danielle Stear, Michael Peter Gurdak, Michael Rol- lin Shumaker, Stephen Joseph Brogan, Timothy John Finn, Jones Day (DC), Louis Richard Cohen, Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering (Washington), William Horace Jeffress, Jr., Christopher R. Cooper, Sara E. Kropf, Jamie S.

Shumaker, Jona- than Chapman Rose, Melissa Danielle Stear, Michael Peter Gurdak, Michael Rol- lin Shumaker, Stephen Joseph Brogan, Timothy John Finn, Jones Day (DC), Louis Richard Cohen, Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering (Washington), William Horace Jeffress, Jr., Christopher R. Cooper, Sara E. Kropf, Jamie S. Kilb

ception to the FSIA applies to negate the Kingdom’s immunity. “[Slovereion immunity under the FSIA is immunity from suit, not just from liabili- ty.” Moran v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 27 F.3d 169, 172 th Cir.1994). Because there were no factual disputes raised in the Court’s resolution of this motion, no