Epstein Secrets

ate: a subtle indicator of global existential angst among Islamists. The event also provoked a strategic realignment in the Gulf, with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait pledging $12 billion in loans to support Egypt's transition, a role primarily occupied by Qatar during the Morsi years. Tunisia: Secula

angirai has admitted he starts his campaign with a "heavy heart," a sentiment shared by many observers. Middle East Egypt: The ousting of President Morsi on July 3rd reflects both continuity and change. It revealed the military establishment's ability to remain a stalwart in Egyptian political life, h

sed Sunni Muslim cleric Yusuf al-Qaradawi issued a fatwa (religious decree) on July 6th imploring Egyptians to support overthrown Islamist president Mohamed Morsi in accordance with sharia law, which "imposes on all believers allegiance to the elected president, to carry out his orders and conform to his dire

ly been understood, to Trump's son-in-law and senior advisor Jared Kushner and his mobile phone. From the perspective of the leaders of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Israel (there is an Israeli angle to the George Nader story, but it isn't yet entirely clear), and Egypt, there was an entirely rational reason to s

hey also believed that Clinton would be soft on Islamists. It is an article of faith in Egypt that she enabled the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood and Mohamed Morsi in 2011 and 2012. For countries in the Persian Gulf, Egypt provides strategic depth, and "losing" it to the Muslim Brotherhood was a major geopolitic

that King Abdullah is seeking to bolster ties with regional allies, perhaps for both political and economic reasons: the King made visits to Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait from January 29th to February Syria: Israeli warplanes are generally believed to have struck a convoy en route to Lebanon on January 30 t

. Press reports indicate willingness by the opposition's to participate in the dialogue. Iran: President Ahmadinejad was warmly welcomed by President Morsi upon arrival in Cairo on February 5th and, interestingly, by the Sunni leadership of Al-Azhar. The Iranian leader reciprocated by offering to provide

imperative that Morsi harmonize relations between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority, and work to reignite Egypt's relations with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. It is notable that officials from these countries have not visited Egypt — even after the elections — despite the fact that Morsi visited Saudi Ara

read, energy stability, security and cleanliness, as well as solving the problem of traffic jams. These priorities bewildered us, and through them, Morsi hit and missed at the same time. It confused us, because he included issues that are impossible to solve in 100 days. He put himself into a dilemma

g from the Middle East. These figures include Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, the crown prince of Abu Dhabi, and the most important defense figure in the United Arab Emirates. MBZ, as he is known, is one of the many Arab leaders who fear (as Israel's leaders do) that any vacuum created by the departure of the U.S. from t

coup and are now running the country. The trip was ill advised for several reasons, starting with its timing. Mr. Kerry arrived one day before Mr. Morsi was to go on trial for murder in a politically motivated case (now postponed until Jan. 8) that had the whole country on edge. Mr. Morsi has been

Canal and automatic permission EFTA_R1_00441472 EFTA01964633 for our military aircraft to transit the region. If we stop our aid, the Saudis and the Arab Emirates will just replace it. There is something to each of these worries, but less than meets the eye. Egypt's rulers behave out of self-interest. They c

he U.S. government for "offensive" anti-Semitic charges that Israel was behind the overthrow of Egypt's President Mohammed Morsi. Compared with Mr. Morsi, however, Mr. Erdogan is a Bismarck of effective governance and smart policy. Mr. Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood were quite simply not ready for

rab world is now in the grip of a hysteria over the Brotherhood. I wish Mr. Hamid had addressed the strange spectacle of the secular government of the United Arab Emirates last year prosecuting dozens of Islamists as alleged members of a fifth column, while Saudi Arabia's Wahhabi government—far more theologically reac

ears about the Brotherhood's secret designs, and the old guard in the military, the bureaucracy and the judiciary was relentless in undermining Mr. Morsi. Ultimately, the Morsi government never got the chance to succeed—or fail. But overthrowing Mr. Morsi wasn't enough for the old guard: In March, a

bal issue that the prominent Saudi cleric Aidh al-Qarni has turned into a Sunni-Shia war by promoting Assad's death. The Saudis and their Qatar and United Arab Emirate allies have pledged $100 million to pay wages to the fighters. Many of the officers of the Free Syrian Army are from tribes connected to the Gulf.

uin and external forces — namely Israel, the US EFTA00711983 and the Palestinians — which will involve revisiting existing security agreements. "Morsi needs to urgently rethink Egypt's security architecture vis-à-vis Israel and the United States," London School of Economics professor Fawaz Gerges