lly in these cases (Fig. 4), the equilibrium A is monotonic inn. Fig. 7 shows how the shape of * changes as the number of iterations increases for the Stag Hunt and the Hawk-Dove game depicted in Fig. 5. Note that to aid in visualizing these surfaces. the viewpoints are different in the two panels and the r

r (iic) c(n) > b(n) (Nowak, 2012). The Prisoner's Dilemma includes all three of these incentives. Games with fewer barriers to cooperation, such as the Stag Hunt and the Hawk-Dove game, represent relaxed cooperative dilemmas. The Harmony Game involves no cooperative dilemma and presents no barrier to cooper

r mutual aid, that instead it would cooperation that would always yield the higher payoff. Between these extremes lie two other kinds of games. In the Stag Hunt (Skyrms, 2004) and related games, the payoff to an individual is higher if it matches the partner's behavior regardless of what that behavior is. C