point of contrast between our model based on multiplying single-step survival probabilities and the behavioral and ecological scenario, Model 2 of De Jaegher and Hoyer (2016) is that in our model the payoff differences a(n) — c(n) and b(n) — d(n) may be non-monotonic. as they are in Fig. 3, whereas these

e Hawk-Dove class, or HD for short. Finally, if a(n) > c(n) and b(n) > d(n), cooperation has the higher payoff regardless of the partner. We follow De Jaegher and Hoyer (2016) and call this a Harmony Game. or HG for short. We refer to the n-step survival game as a repeated or iterated game because the pa

owever, this decrease cannot continue because all games become neutral as n approaches infinity. Fig. 3 may be compared to Fig. 4 (Model 2AIII) of De Jaegher and Hoyer (2016). with their number of attacks being analogous to n. A point of contrast between our model based on multiplying single-step surviv