cuit has made very clear that, for purposes of the FSIA, a commercial activity must be one in which a private person can engage lawfully. Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 748 F.2d 790, 797-98 (2d Cir.1984); see also Saudi Ara- bia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 360-62, 113 S.Ct. 1471, 123 L.Ed.2d 47 (1993) (holding detainin

Court subsequently acknowledged that Samantar “abrogated [Terrorist Attacks IT insofar as it held FSIA applied to individual officials.” Carpenter v. Republic of Chile, 610 F.3d 776 (2d Cir. 2010). Throughout the course of the prior appeals to this Court and related proceedings before the Supreme Court, approximate