itoriality (Maynard Smith & Price, 1973, to be reviewed shortly), the Hawk—Dove model sheds light onto our sense of rights (Descioli & Karpoff, 2014; Gintis, 2007; Myerson, 2004). Let us begin by asking the following question (Myerson, 2004): “Why [does] a passenger pay a taxi driver after getting out of

gain. However, the source of loss aversion is not questioned or explained. When it is, loss aversion is also readily explained by the Hawk—Dove game (Gintis, 2007). A second bias that also fits the Hawk—Dove model is the IKEA effect: Our valu- ation of an object is influenced by whether we have developed

, & Bowles, 8. (2010). Coordinated punishment of defectors sustains cooperation and can proliferate when rare. Science, 328(5978), 617-620; Boyd, R., Gintis, H., Bowles, S., & Richerson, P.J. (2003). The evolution of altruistic punishment. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, USA, 100, 3531-35

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