Epstein Secrets

tions that a deceased witness might have provided favorable testimony do not justify dismissing an indictment for delay. See, e.g., United States v. Scala, 388 F. Supp. 2d 396, 399-400 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). The Court agrees with this approach. Maxwell 17 EFTA00020277 --- PAGE BREAK --- Case 1:20-cr-003

stions that are so fundamentally ambiguous or imprecise that the answer to them cannot legally be false. Id. at 372, 375; see also United States v. Wolfson, 437 F.2d 862, 878 (2d Cir. 1970). A question is fundamentally ambiguous only if reasonable people could not agree on its meaning in context. Lighte

tions that a deceased witness might have provided favorable testimony do not justify dismissing an indictment for delay. See, e.g., United States v. Scala, 388 F. Supp. 2d 396, 399-400 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). The Court agrees with this approach. Maxwell 17 EFTA00022107 --- PAGE BREAK --- Case 1:20-cr-003

stions that are so fundamentally ambiguous or imprecise that the answer to them cannot legally be false. Id. at 372, 375; see also United States v. Wolfson, 437 F.2d 862, 878 (2d Cir. 1970). A question is fundamentally ambiguous only if reasonable people could not agree on its meaning in context. Lighte

tions that a deceased witness might have provided favorable testimony do not justify dismissing an indictment for delay. See, e.g., United States v. Scala, 388 F. Supp. 2d 396, 399-400 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). The Court agrees with this approach. Maxwell 17 EFTA00029556 --- PAGE BREAK --- Case 1:20-cr-003

stions that are so fundamentally ambiguous or imprecise that the answer to them cannot legally be false. Id. at 372, 375; see also United States v. Wolfson, 437 F.2d 862, 878 (2d Cir. 1970). A question is fundamentally ambiguous only if reasonable people could not agree on its meaning in context. Lighte