Epstein Secrets

y to enforce its orders, to conduct its business in a proper manner, and to protect the court from acts obstructing the administration of justice." Levin, Middlebrooks, Mabie, Maves & Mitchell, P.A. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 639 So.2d 606, 608-09 (Fla. 1994). Most recently, the Supreme Court i

es expressly addressed to the trial court's exercise of discretion. See Event Services America, Inc. v. Ragusa 917 So.2d 882 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005). As the Florida Supreme Court later explained, Icilearly, a trial judge has the inherent power to do those things necessary to enforce its orders, to conduct its business in a p

attorneys by listing the attorneys as witnesses in a separate case in order to prevent them from serving as attorneys in that case. Id. at 607. The Levin court held the attorneys' conduct was shielded against the plaintiff's suit by Florida's litigation privilege. Id. Thirteen years after Levitt, th

Fla. 197, 44 So. 357 (1907). In Levitt, Middlebrooks, Mabie, Thomas, Mayes & Mitchell, P.A. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 639 So.2d 606, 608 (Fla.I994), the Florida Supreme Court extended the litigation privilege, already applicable to defamatory statements (slander and libel) and perjury, to all other torts so long as the

on. Id. (emphasis added). The court's focus was on "whether the acts alleged coccurredied] during the course of a judicial proceeding."' Id. (citing Levin, 639 So. 2d at 608). The court, relying upon Florida Supreme Court Cases, held that because the acts that formed the basis of the suit occurred aft

ing and a lengthy hearing, this Court ruled that the litigation privilege barred Edwards's causes of action against Epstein. The Court, in applying the Florida Supreme Court binding precedent as espoused in Levin, Middlebrooks, Moves & Mitchell, v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 639 So. 2d 606, 608 (Fla. 1994) and Echevarria, McCa

ons in a subsequent civil action for misconduct.' Echevarria, McCalla, Raymer, Barrett & Frappier v. Cole, 950 So.2d 380, 384 (Fla. 2007); see also Levin, 639 So.2d at 608 C[A]bsolute immunity must be afforded to any act occurring during the course of a judicial proceeding [...], so long as that con

ving the litigation privilege. In the instant case, the trial court was legally bound by the Third District Court of Appeal's decision in Wolfe, as the Florida Supreme Court stated unequivocally that a "trial court may not overrule or recede from the controlling decision of" an appellate court. Pardo v. State, 596 So. 2

ntitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fla. R.Civ. P. 1.510(c). This court, in applying the Florida Supreme Court binding precedent as espoused in Levin, Middlebrooks, Moves & Mitchell, v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 639 So. 2d 606, 608 (Fla. 1994) and Echevarria, McCalla, Rayner, Barrett & Frappier v. Cole,

ssue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fla. R.Civ. P. 1.510(c). This court, in applying the Florida Supreme Court binding precedent as espoused in Levin, Middlebrooks, Moves & Mitchell, v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 639 So. 2d 606, 608 (Fla. 1994) and Echevarria, McCa

ion. Id. (emphasis added). The court's focus was on "whether the acts alleged 'occurred[ed] during the course of a judicial proceeding.' Id. (citing Levin, 639 So. 2d at 608). The court, relying upon Florida Supreme Court Cases, held that because the acts that formed the basis of the suit occurred aft

ing and a lengthy hearing, this Court ruled that the litigation privilege barred Edwards's causes of action against Epstein. The Court, in applying the Florida Supreme Court binding precedent as espoused in Levin, Middlebrooks, Moves & Mitchell, v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 639 So. 2d 606, 608 (Fla. 1994) and Echevarria, McCa