Epstein Secrets

ge is rooted in the imperative for confidence and trust, the evidentiary benefit of the denial of the privilege, and any consensus among the states, Jaffee' Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10-15, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1928-31 (1996)—but none of these considerations weighs in favor of recognizing a new privilege to pre

venors concede too that the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment had not yet attached when the correspondence was exchanged. Lumley'. City of Dade City, Fla., 327 F.3d 1186, 1195 (11th Cir. 2003) ("[T]he Sixth Amendment right to counsel ordinarily does not arise until there is a formal commitment b

ge is rooted in the imperative for confidence and trust, the evidentiary benefit of the denial of the privilege, and any consensus among the states, Jaffee' Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10-15, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1928-31 (1996)—but none of these considerations weighs in favor of recognizing a new privilege to pre

venors concede too that the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment had not yet attached when the correspondence was exchanged. Lumley'. City of Dade City, Fla., 327 F.3d 1186, 1195 (11th Cir. 2003) ("[T]he Sixth Amendment right to counsel ordinarily does not arise until there is a formal commitment b

ge is rooted in the imperative for confidence and trust, the evidentiary benefit of the denial of the privilege, and any consensus among the states, Jaffee'. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10-15, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1928-31 (1996)—but none of these considerations weighs in favor of recognizing a new privilege to pr

venors concede too that the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment had not yet attached when the correspondence was exchanged. Lumley'. City of Dade City, Fla., 327 F.3d 1186, 1195 (11th Cir. 2003) ("[T]he Sixth Amendment right to counsel ordinarily does not arise until there is a formal commitment b

hip, unlike the confiden- tial relationship of a doctor and patient or attorney and client, warrants no privilege beyond the terms of Rule 410. See Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 10, 116 S.Ct. at 1928. But the victims would enjoy an evidentiary benefit from the disclosure of plea negotiations to prove whether t

oncede too that the right to coun- sel under the Sixth Amendment had not yet attached when the correspondence was ex- changed. See Lumley I. City of Dade City, Fla., 327 F.3d 1186, 1195 (11th Cir.2003) (^[Ilhe Sixth Amendment right to counsel ordinarily does not arise until there is a formal commitment by

ionship, unlike the confidential relationship of a doctor and patient or attorney and client, warrants no privilege beyond the terms of Rule 410. See Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 10. But the victims would enjoy an evidentiary benefit from the disclosure of plea negotiations to prove whether the United States viola

rvenors concede too that the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment had not yet attached when the correspondence was exchanged. Lumley v, City of Dade City, Fla., 327 F.3d 1186, 1195 (1 1th Cir. 2003) (“{TJhe Sixth Amendment right to counsel ordinarily does not arise until there is a formal commitment by