Epstein Secrets

o have some adverse effect upon a defendant beyond tending to prove the fact or issue that justified its admission into evidence." United States v. Figueroa, 618 F.2d 934, 943 (2d Cir. 1980). Other acts evidence is typically not unfairly prejudicial where it is not "any more sensational or disturbing tha

ictim-3's experiences in the Indictment "may not be stricken" "regardless of how prejudicial the language is .. ." Scarpa, 913 F.2d at 1013 (quoting DePahna, 461 F. Supp. at 797). Finally, even if Minor Victim-3's experiences did not constitute direct evidence of the crimes charged—which they do—this s

o have some adverse effect upon a defendant beyond tending to prove the fact or issue that justified its admission into evidence." United States v. Figueroa, 618 F.2d 934, 943 (2d Cir. 1980). Other acts evidence is typically not unfairly prejudicial where it is not "any more sensational or disturbing tha

ictim-3's experiences in the Indictment "may not be stricken" "regardless of how prejudicial the language is .. ." Scarpa, 913 F.2d at 1013 (quoting DePahna, 461 F. Supp. at 797). Finally, even if Minor Victim-3's experiences did not constitute direct evidence of the crimes charged—which they do—this s

tates v. Feldman, 939 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2019) 6, 18, 22 United States v. Fennell, 496 F. Supp. 2d 279 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 192, 194 United States v. Figueroa, 618 F.2d 934 (2d Cir. 1980) 167 United States v. Fiumano, No. 14 Cr. 518 (JFK), 2016 WL 1629356 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2016) 48 United States v. F

17 Cr. 585 (WHP), 2018 WL 740727 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2018) 114 United States v. Delacruz, 970 F. Supp. 2d 199 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 53 United States v. DePahna, 461 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) 159, 164 United States v. Dewar, 489 F. Supp. 2d 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 112 United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52

o have some adverse effect upon a defendant beyond tending to prove the fact or issue that justified its admission into evidence." United States v. Figueroa, 618 F.2d 934, 943 (2d Cir. 1980). Other acts evidence is typically not unfairly prejudicial where it is not "any more sensational or disturbing tha

ant to the charge, then regardless of how prejudicial the language is, it may not be stricken." Id. (brackets in original) (quoting United States v. DePahna, 461 F. Supp. 778, 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)); see also United States v. Mulder, 273 F.3d 91, 99 (2d Cir. 2001). "This standard is an exacting one, and o