Epstein Secrets

[DECEMBER DRAFT--- 287 pages] THE SNOWDEN AFFAIR A Spy Story in Six Parts By Edward Jay Epstein HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020153 Chapter One Chapter Two Chapter Three Chapter Four Chapter Five Ch

[TK] HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020156 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020157 Chronology 1: Snowden Thriller: From Honolulu to Moscow in 82 Days. April 8, 2013, Honolulu. Edward Snowden begins working as an infrastructure-analyst in training at the National Threat Operations Center for outside contractor Booz Allen Hamilton. June 5,

secution. To be sure, the view of those on the Snowden side of the divide is not grounded in legal definitions, but in a broader notion of morality. Snowden‘s supporters do not accept that the law should be applied in this fashion to Snowden. They argue that Snowden had a moral imperative to act, even if it

ole of concealment must be taken into account when assessing information bearing on the work of espionage services. I learned when I was interviewing James Jesus Angleton, the CIA’s legendary ex-counterintelligence chief of the CIA in the 1970s for my book on deception that intelligence services play by a different set

led comprehensively, and each level of oversight, each level of re- sponsibility that should have addressed this, abdicated their re- sponsibility. —EDWARD SNOWDEN, Moscow, 2013 Wi SNOWDEN in Hong Kong was attempting to reel in the journalists, Lindsay Mills returned to Honolulu from her “island-hopping” trip t

as attempting to reel in the journalists, Lindsay Mills returned to Honolulu from her “island-hopping” trip to find their house partially flooded and Snowden nowhere to be found. In a brief note Snowden left her, he said he was away on a business trip and indicated that, at least tem- porarily, their eight

. The role of concealment must be taken into account when assess- ing information bearing on the work of espionage services. When I was interviewing James Jesus Angleton—the CIA’s legendary ex- counterintelligence chief, active in the 1970s—for a book on decep- tion, I learned that intelligence services play by a diff

entation of more sophisticated secu- rity procedures, such as the polygraph examination and extensive background checks. In 1995, eleven years before Snowden joined it, the CIA’s inspector general completed a study of the KGB’s use of false defectors to mislead the U.S. government from the end of the Cold

sses of a nation’s potential adversaries. The most impor- tant of these in peacetime is communication intercepts. It was just such state secrets that Edward Snowden took from the NSA in the spring of 2013. Before that breach, America’s paramount advantage in this subterranean competition was its undisputed domina

. When it comes to recruiting moles in a larger universe, intelli- gence services operate much like highly specialized corporate “head- hunters,” as James Jesus Angleton described the process to me during the Cold War era. He was referring to the similar approach that cor- porate human resource divisions had with espi