Epstein Secrets

Middle East Dennis Ross Article 3. Al Jazeera AIPAC: American watchdog or Israel's attack-dog? Marwan Bishara Article 4. The Washington Post Putin's aggression in Ukraine needs a response Zbigniew Brzezinski Article 5. The Daily Star Jordanian jihadists are on the rise EFTA00659669 Mona A

lso have to consider where that may or may not make sense for their own interests." The most obvious target is Syria, experts said, where President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia would be even less likely to abandon President Bashar al-Assad. Mr. Putin, most of the experts agreed, would probably follow through on t

legitimate sovereign government. EFTA00659672 "President Putin has consistently suggested that the reason for op

us target is Syria, experts said, where President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia would be even less likely to

How Ukraine will Shape the Future of the Middle East Dennis Ross March 2, 2014 -- Vladimir Putin has done it again. Transnistria, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia, and now Crimea; wherever there are potentially ethnic Russian areas in former Soviet republics that are not prepared to toe the Russian line, ther

+0000 28 February, 2014 Article I. The National Interest Ukraine: Will Putin Strike? Joergen Oerstroem Moeller Article 2. The Washington Post Putin's Ukraine gambit Charles Krauthammer Article 3. The Daily Beast Does Alleged Corruption Video Spell the End Of Erdogan? Thomas Seibert Article

Russia had been expanding at the rate of one Belgium per year. All undone, of course, by the collapse of the Soviet Union, which Russian President Vladimir Putin called "the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the [20th] century." Putin's mission is restoration. First, restore traditional Russian despotism

A00684328 For those in doubt, suffice to recall President Putin's statement in 2006 that the collapse of the Sov

apse of the Soviet Union, which Russian President Vladimir Putin called "the greatest geopolitical catastro

in Putin's equation the military risks would be EFTA00684330 negligible. Nothing happened in 2008 when Russia sent its military into Georgia and South Ossetia. In fact Georgia-South Ossetia 2008 might serve—with some modifications-as a blueprint. The main risks would be economic sanctions imposed by the W

ting much in the way of access, trade or aid with Europe. But let's not persist in believing that Moscow's moves have been strategically brilliant. Vladimir Putin must have watched with extreme frustration in February as a pro-Russian government was toppled and Ukraine was slipping from his grasp. After the

was slipping from his grasp. After the Olympics ended, he acted swiftly, sending his forces into Crimea. It was a blunder. In taking over Crimea, Putin has lost Ukraine. Since 1991, Russia has influenced Ukraine through pro-Russian politicians who were bribed by Moscow to listen to its diktats. Tha

oscow's moves have been strategically brilliant. Vladimir Putin must have watched with extreme frustration

l. In a rare break with Russia on the U.N. Security Council, China refused to condone Russia's moves in Crimea. Moscow's annexation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia was recognized by Nicaragm, Venezuela and two island nations in the South Pacific. That might be as many as will recognize the annexa

A display of supremacy In December 2011, members of the Russian opposition obtained video evidence of ballot stuffing committed by operatives from Vladimir Putin's United Russia party in that month's parliamentary elections. A series of unusu- ally large protests ensued. Putin weathered the furor and went on t

n authoritarians. Again, Russia has taken the lead, with the state's asser- tion of authority over history textbooks and the process, encouraged by Putin, of reassessing the historical role of Joseph Stalin. • The hiring of political consultants and lobbyists from democratic countries to represent t

hinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Beijing. 2016. Lintao Zhang/Getty Images

and Methods of Modern Authoritarians 7. Military invasions: Russian forces poured into Georgia through its two breakaway territories, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, during a brief con- flict in 2008. In 2014, Russian troops occupied Crimea, oversaw a stage-managed referendum on annexation there, and unofficial

y 5, 2014 -- The German philosopher Jurgen Habermas once defined our times as "the age of post-national identity." Try convincing Russian President Vladimir Putin of that. Indeed, the great paradox of the current era of globalization is that the quest for homogeneity has been accompanied by a longing for ethn

A similar risk can be found in Catalonia's bid for independence from Spain. The central state always has its own nation-building responsibilities. Putin can manipulate Ukraine not because there is a shred of credibility to his claim that the Russian minority there faces persecution, but because Ukr

onal identity." Try convincing Russian President Vladimir Putin of that. Indeed, the great paradox of the

rd-headed realists have argued that even if Ukraine shrinks with the loss of several autonomous republics (as Georgia did in 2008 when Abkhazia and South Ossetia seceded), the impact on American interests would be limited. They also argue that since it is now clear that no one (other than Russia) is prepared

r program is also highlighting increased Israeli and U.S. involvement in the Caucasus. Apart from everything else, this has to feed President-elect Vladimir Putin's paranoia about U.S. efforts to become an active player in what Russia considers its own backyard. But, of course, it's the Iranians who are the mo

g else, this has to feed President-elect Vladimir Putin's paranoia about U.S. efforts to become an activ

everything else, this has to feed President-elect Vladimir Putin's paranoia about U.S. efforts to become an

Moscow got its lease on military facilities in Armenia extended to 2044, and its lease in the breakaway formerly Georgian republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by 49 years. Russia's $22 million-a-year lease on the Gabala radar station in Azerbaijan that can track Iranian missiles runs out in December. Aze

co The Ambivalent Superpower Robert Kagan Anecle I. NYT What Is Russia's Aim in Ukraine? Ed t o r a 1 EFTA00684250 Feb. 28, 2014 -- President Vladimir Putin of Russia played the genial host at the Olympic Games in Sochi, but his dangerous approach to geopolitics could be his true legacy. On Friday, Ukr

e promising to defend the interests of Russian citizens in Ukraine, Moscow has said it will not intervene by force. EFTA00684251 But whether Mr. Putin will abide by that promise is unclear. In 2008, he sent Russian forces into neighboring Georgia, ostensibly to protect the secessionist Georgian en

r a 1 EFTA00684250 Feb. 28, 2014 -- President Vladimir Putin of Russia played the genial host at the Ol

de by that promise is unclear. In 2008, he sent Russian forces into neighboring Georgia, ostensibly to protect the secessionist Georgian enclave of South Ossetia; the real goal was to weaken the pro-Western government in Tbilisi. Russia and the West both have legitimate interests in Ukraine and its future.

costs, and recent history has shown that when it considers its interests at stake, Russia has been willing to pay the price. Even before President Vladimir V. Putin on Saturday publicly declared his intent to send Russian troops into the Ukrainian territory of Crimea, Mr. Obama and his team were already discuss

ent Russian news site, how the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, in 1979, under the pretext of helping a "fraternal" ally in Kabul; to Parkhomenko, Putin's decision to couch his military action as the "protection" of Russians living in Crimea is an equally transparent pretext. The same goes for the d

utin Goes to War David Remnick March 1, 2014 -- Vladimir Putin, the Russian President and autocrat, had a

Some compared the arrival of Russian troops in Simferopol to the way that the Kremlin, in 2008, took advantage of Georgia's reckless bid to retake South Ossetia and then muscled its tiny neighbor, eventually waging a war that ended with Russia taking control of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In a recent Lette

ern authoritarians. Again, Russia has taken the lead, with the state's asser- tion of authority over history textbooks and the process, encouraged by Putin, of reassessing the historical role of Joseph Stalin. ¢ The hiring of political consultants and lobbyists from democratic countries to represent th

represent undue interference in their domestic affairs and a violation of national pre- rogatives. 3. Dictatorship of law: Initially articulated by Vlad- imir Putin, this phrase has come to signify the adoption of laws that are so vaguely written as to www.freedomhouse.org HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_019241 --- PAGE BREAK

ernment. ls Orban a Central European version of Putin? Orban's domestic critics have often compared his governing style to that of Russian president Vladimir Putin. On the surface, the comparison seems unfair. Hungary is still rated Free by Freedom House. It still has genuine opposition parties, however we

o cast ballots than it is for Hungarian citizens who are tempo- rarily working in Europe or elsewhere. ¢ Asa matter of high priority, both Orban and Pu- tin have secured domination over the judiciary with the goal of removing its role as a check on their power. ‘Law and Justice’ in Poland Like Hungary,