Epstein Secrets

r exchange between him and Mills (who was in Honolulu). That day Mills informed Snowden that two government investiga- tors had come to their home in Hawaii, asking her about Snowden’s whereabouts. When he had failed to show up for work on June 3 it | | Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 91 @ 9/29/16 5:

. The role of concealment must be taken into account when assess- ing information bearing on the work of espionage services. When I was interviewing James Jesus Angleton—the CIA’s legendary ex- counterintelligence chief, active in the 1970s—for a book on decep- tion, I learned that intelligence services play by a diff

gence by the NSA @ was hardly a secret. As the NSA expanded further, it delegated part of its work to regional bases, including ones in Utah, Texas, Hawaii, and Japan. The paramount task of the NSA remained monitoring the channels of communications that an adversary might use. The vast prolifera- tion of

. When it comes to recruiting moles in a larger universe, intelli- gence services operate much like highly specialized corporate “head- hunters,” as James Jesus Angleton described the process to me during the Cold War era. He was referring to the similar approach that cor- porate human resource divisions had with espi

e number of its most secret files had been stolen. The suspect was Edward Snowden, a 29 year old civilian analyst at the NSA’s regional base in Oahu, Hawaii, who had fled to Hong Kong. The stolen documents revealed, among other things, the secret tools and capabilities that the NSA employed to do its job.

ole of concealment must be taken into account when assessing information bearing on the work of espionage services. I learned when I was interviewing James Jesus Angleton, the CIA’s legendary ex-counterintelligence chief of the CIA in the 1970s for my book on deception that intelligence services play by a different set