Epstein Secrets

e is neither new nor controversial; indeed, a "two-state solution" is the logical terminus of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process begun in Oslo, Norway in 1993. But the belief that such a political reality can be created unilaterally is both. It undermines the long-running dialogue between Israelis

must be made impenetrable. This cannot be done remotely, from the 1967 lines; it will require a joint Israeli-Palestinian military presence along the Jordan River. Such joint military activity would not violate Palestinian sovereignty and could be modeled on Israel's current coordination with Palestinian secu

e is neither new nor controversial; indeed, a "two-state solution" is the logical terminus of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process begun in Oslo, Norway in 1993. But the belief that such a political reality can be created unilaterally is both. It undermines the long-running dialogue between Israelis

must be made impenetrable. This cannot be done remotely, from the 1967 lines; it will require a joint Israeli-Palestinian military presence along the Jordan River. Such joint military activity would not violate Palestinian sovereignty and could be modeled on Israel's current coordination with Palestinian secu

, was a small religious party called Meimad, inspired by an openly pro-peace Orthodox rabbi named Yehuda Amital and including a former Chief Rabbi of Norway, Michael Melchior. By the end of January 1999, several months before the real campaign, I was feeling better about where we stood, in part because o

st Jerusalem, I expected to be able to retain Israeli sovereignty over the city. The third principle was that there would be “no foreign army west of the Jordan River.” In other words, if we did hand back at least the major part of the West Bank, it would be demilitarized and we would have security control over the

, was a small religious party called Meimad, inspired by an openly pro-peace Orthodox rabbi named Yehuda Amital and including a former Chief Rabbi of Norway, Michael Melchior. By the end of January 1999, several months before the real campaign, I was feeling better about where we stood, in part because of

st Jerusalem, I expected to be able to retain Israeli sovereignty over the city. The third principle was that there would be "no foreign army west of the Jordan River." In other words, if we did hand back at least the major part of the West Bank, it would be demilitarized and we would have security control over the