Epstein Secrets

the long run. Am. Nat. 181.451-463. Taylor. P.D.. Jon ker. L. 1978. Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics. Math. Biosa. 40. 145-156. Trivers. R.L. 1971. The evolution of reciprocal altruism. Quart. Rev. Biol. 46. 35-57. Tucker.A.. 1950.A tyro-person dilemma. In: Rasmussen. E. (Ed.). Read

antages to mutual cooperation. For example, in the classic two-player game called the Prisoner's Dilemma (Tucker, 1950; Rapoport and Chammah, 1965; Axelrod. 1984). cooperation results in a "reward payoff' if one's partner also cooperates but a "suckers payoff' if one's partner defects. Defection yield

London: Yale University Press. Putnam, Robert D. 2000. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York: Simon & Schuster. Trivers, Robert. 1985. Social Evolution. Menlo Park, CA: Benjamin/Cummings. Wright, Robert. 2000. Non-Zero: The Logic of Human Destiny. New York: Pantheon.

aise for The Evolution of Cooperation "I never expected to find wisdom or hope for the future of our species in a computer game, but here it is, in Axelrod's book. Read it." —LEWIS THOMAS, State University of New York, Stony Brook "Our ideas of cooperation will never be the same again.... This book, if

ly applied in biological contexts to explain phenomena such as animal sex ratios (Fisher, 1958), territoriality (Smith & Price, 1973), coop- eration (Trivers, 1971), sexual displays (Zahavi, 1975), and parent—offspring con- flict (Trivers, 1974). More recently, evolutionary dynamic models have been applied

with Incomplete Information The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma has famously been used as an explanation for the evolution of cooperation among non-kin (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981; Dawkins, 2006; Pinker, 2003; Trivers, 1971). In this section, we show how the same basic model can be used to explain many of the q