Epstein Secrets

le." Id. at 187. "[T]he Fifth Amendment proscribes only self-incrimination obtained by a 'genuine compulsion of testimony." Id. (quotingMichigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 440 (1974)); see also Washington, 431 U.S. at 187 ("Absent some officially coerced self-accusation, the Fifth Amendment privilege is

t that the defendant "had not engaged in any business activity during the preceding six years").53 Accordingly, and consistent with the holdings in Ruiz and Broccolo, this Court should deny the severance motion. The defendant argues that the offenses are not connected because they involve different time periods.

." Id. at 187. "[T]he Fifth Amendment proscribes only self-incrimination obtained by a `genuine compulsion of testimony.'" Id. (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 440 (1974)); see also Washington, 431 U.S. at 187 ("Absent some officially coerced self-accusation, the Fifth Amendment privilege is

t that the defendant "had not engaged in any business activity during the preceding six years").53 Accordingly, and consistent with the holdings in Ruiz and Broccolo, this Court should deny the severance motion. The defendant argues that the offenses are not connected because they involve different time periods.

." Id. at 187. "[T]he Fifth Amendment proscribes only self-incrimination obtained by a `genuine compulsion of testimony.'" Id. (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 440 (1974)); see also Washington, 431 U.S. at 187 ("Absent some officially coerced self-accusation, the Fifth Amendment privilege is

t that the defendant "had not engaged in any business activity during the preceding six years").53 Accordingly, and consistent with the holdings in Ruiz and Broccolo, this Court should deny the severance motion. The defendant argues that the offenses are not connected because they involve different time periods.

." Id. at 187. "[T]he Fifth Amendment proscribes only self-incrimination obtained by a `genuine compulsion of testimony.'" Id. (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 440 (1974)); see also Washington, 431 U.S. at 187 ("Absent some officially coerced self-accusation, the Fifth Amendment privilege is

rt that the defendant "had not engaged in any business activity during the preceding six years").54 Accordingly, and consistent with the holding in Ruiz and Broccolo, this Court should deny the severance motion. 54 While the defendant may argue that the fact that her deposition, unlike Ruiz, did not involve crim

" Id. at 187. "[T]tle Fifth Amendment proscribes only self-incrimination obtained by a `genuine compulsion of testimony.'" Id. (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 440 (1974)); see also Washington, 431 U.S. at 187 ("Absent some officially coerced self-accusation, the Fifth Amendment privilege is

t that the defendant "had not engaged in any business activity during the preceding six years").53 Accordingly, and consistent with the holdings in Ruiz and Broccolo, this Court should deny the severance motion. The defendant argues that the offenses are not connected because they involve different time periods.