Epstein Secrets

9 United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966) 80 EFTA00099954 United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2008) 166, 169 United States v. Farmer, 137 F.3d 1265 (10th Cir. 1998) 179, 180 United States v. Feldman, 939 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2019) 8,20,27 United States v. Fennel!, 496 F. Supp.

respect to Maxwell in particular, OPR interviewed Maria Villafaila, the lead prosecutor on the case, and

015) 124 United States v. Reeves, et al., 16 Cr. 372 (VEC) 286 United States v. Remington, 208 F.2d 567 (2d Cir. 1953) 146 United States v. Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S. 102 (2007) 227, 235 United States v. Ricco, 549 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1977) 61 United States v. Richardson, 512 F.2d 105 (3d Cir. 1975)

respect to Maxwell in particular, OPR interviewed Maria Villafatia, the lead prosecutor on the case, and

. 2003) 259 United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966) 80 EFTA00103012 United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2008) United States v. Farmer, 137 F.3d 1265 (10th Cir. 1998) United States v. Feldman, 939 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2019) United States v. Fennell, 166, 169 179, 180 8, 20, 27 4

015) 124 United States v. Reeves, et al., 16 Cr. 372 (VEC) 286 United States v. Remington, 208 F.2d 567 (2d Cir. 1953) 146 United States v. Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S. 102 (2007) 227, 235 United States v. Ricco, 549 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1977) 61 United States v. Richardson, 512 F.2d 105 (3d Cir. 1975)

mental ambiguity," however, "is the exception, not the rule." United States v. Sarwari, 669 F.3d 401, 407 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Farmer, 137 F.3d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir. 1998)). A defendant cannot demonstrate fundamental ambiguity simply by showing that words used in a question are ame

d second, it must "enable[)" a defendant "to plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of future prosecutions for the same offense." United States v. Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S. 102, 108 (2007) (internal quotation mark omitted) (quotingHamling, 418 U.S. at 117). "[A]n indictment parroting the language of a federal

at 61-62. However, although the line prosecutor, Maria Villafaiia, subsequently sent the CEOS Chief a d

2015) 124 United States v. Reeves, et al., 16 Cr. 372 (VEC) 286 United States v. Remington, 208 F.2d 567 (2d Cir. 1953) 146 United States v. Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S. 102 (2007) 227, 235 United States v. Ricco, 549 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1977) 61 United States v. Richardson, 512 F.2d 105 (3d Cir. 1975)

d following the development of a full factual record. See, e.g., Strohm, 671 at 1175 (appeal following conviction); SanvaH, 669 F.3d at 406 (same); Farmer, 137 F.3d at 1269 (appeal following conviction and partial Rule 29 dismissal) Marldewicz, 978 F.2d at 808 (appeal following conviction); cf. United

d second, it must "enable[]" a defendant "to plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of future prosecutions for the same offense." United States v. Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S. 102, 108 (2007) (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting Handing, 418 U.S. at 117). "[A]n indictment parroting the language of a federa

at 61-62. However, although the line prosecutor, Maria Villafaiia, subsequently sent the CEOS Chief a d

2015) 124 United States v. Reeves, et al., 16 Cr. 372 (VEC) 286 United States v. Remington, 208 F.2d 567 (2d Cir. 1953) 146 United States v. Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S. 102 (2007) 227, 235 United States v. Ricco, 549 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1977) 61 United States v. Richardson, 512 F.2d 105 (3d Cir. 1975)

d following the development of a full factual record. See, e.g., Strohm, 671 at 1175 (appeal following conviction); SanvaH, 669 F.3d at 406 (same); Farmer, 137 F.3d at 1269 (appeal following conviction and partial Rule 29 dismissal) Marldewicz, 978 F.2d at 808 (appeal following conviction); cf. United

d second, it must "enable[]" a defendant "to plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of future prosecutions for the same offense." United States v. Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S. 102, 108 (2007) (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting Handing, 418 U.S. at 117). "[A]n indictment parroting the language of a federa

potential co- conspirators of Epstein" evolved from a more narrow provision sought by the defense. The provision expanded as [USAO-SDFL prosecutor Maria] Villafana and defense counsel exchanged drafts of, first, a proposed federal plea agreement and, then, of the NPA, with apparently little analysis

7) 208 United States v. Raymonda, 780 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2015) 87 United States v. Remington, 208 F.2d 567 (2d Cir. 1953) 101 United States v. Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S. 102 (2007) 150, 155 xviii EFTA00095085 United States v. Ricco, 549 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1977) 42 United States v. Richardson, 512 F.

following the development of a full factual record. See, e.g., Strohm, 671 at 1175 (appeal following conviction); Sarivari, 669 F.3d at 406 (same); Farmer, 137 F.3d at 1269 (appeal following conviction and partial Rule 29 dismissal) Marldewicz, 978 F.2d at 808 (appeal following conviction); cf. United

d second, it must "enable[]" a defendant "to plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of future prosecutions for the same offense." United States v. Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S. 102, 108 (2007) (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting Hamling, 418 U.S. at 117). "[A]n indictment parroting the language of a federa