Epstein Secrets

respect to Maxwell in particular, OPR interviewed Maria Villafatia, the lead prosecutor on the case, and

. 2003) 259 United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966) 80 EFTA00103012 United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2008) United States v. Farmer, 137 F.3d 1265 (10th Cir. 1998) United States v. Feldman, 939 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2019) United States v. Fennell, 166, 169 179, 180 8, 20, 27 4

ir. 1990) passim United States v. Schaefer, No. 17 Cr. 400 (HZ), 2019 WL 267711 (D. Or. Jan. 17, 2019) 121 xxi EFTA00103020 United States v. Schafrick, 871 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1989) 182 United States v. Schmidt, 105 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 1997) 153, 154 United States v. Schneider, 801 F.3d 186 (3d

mental ambiguity," however, "is the exception, not the rule." United States v. Sarwari, 669 F.3d 401, 407 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Farmer, 137 F.3d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir. 1998)). A defendant cannot demonstrate fundamental ambiguity simply by showing that words used in a question are ame

in isolation" can support a perjury conviction if they are "materially untrue" in "the context in which the statements were made." United States v. Schafrick, 871 F.2d 300, 304 (2d Cir. 1989). "[U]nless the questioning is fundamentally ambiguous or imprecise, the truthfulness of [the defendant's] answers

at 61-62. However, although the line prosecutor, Maria Villafaiia, subsequently sent the CEOS Chief a d

Cir. 1990) passim United States v. Schaefer, No. 17 Cr. 400 (HZ), 2019 WL 267711 (D. Or. Jan. 17. 2019) 121 xxi EFTA00077627 United States v. Schafrick, 871 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1989) 182 United States v. Schmidt, 105 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 1997) 153, 154 United States v. Schneider, 801 F.3d 186 (3d Ci

at 61-62. However, although the line prosecutor, Maria Villafaiia, subsequently sent the CEOS Chief a d

Cir. 1990) passim United States v. Schaefer, No. 17 Cr. 400 (HZ), 2019 WL 267711 (D. Or. Jan. 17. 2019) 121 xxi EFTA00039442 United States v. Schafrick, 871 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1989) 182 United States v. Schmidt, 105 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 1997) 153, 154 United States v. Schneider, 801 F.3d 186 (3d Ci

potential co- conspirators of Epstein" evolved from a more narrow provision sought by the defense. The provision expanded as [USAO-SDFL prosecutor Maria] Villafana and defense counsel exchanged drafts of, first, a proposed federal plea agreement and, then, of the NPA, with apparently little analysis

caipa, 913 F.3d 993 (2d Cir. 1990) 42 United States v. Schaefer, No. 17 Cr. 400 (HZ), 2019 WL 267711 (D. Or. Jan. 17, 2019) 86 United States v. Schafrick, 871 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1989) 121 United States v. Schmidt, 105 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 1997) 105 United States v. Schneider, 801 F.3d 186 (3d Cir. 20

following the development of a full factual record. See, e.g., Strohm, 671 at 1175 (appeal following conviction); Sarivari, 669 F.3d at 406 (same); Farmer, 137 F.3d at 1269 (appeal following conviction and partial Rule 29 dismissal) Marldewicz, 978 F.2d at 808 (appeal following conviction); cf. United

in isolation" can support a perjury conviction if they are "materially untrue" in "the context in which the statements were made." United States v. Schafrick, 871 F.2d 300, 304 (2d Cir. 1989). "[U]nless the questioning is fundamentally ambiguous or imprecise, the truthfulness of [the defendant's] answers