Epstein Secrets

e that the defendant "knowingly and willfully intended to commit the offense" — i.e., that he intended to commit the crime. I 1 th Cir. Pattern Jury Instr., Special Instr. 11 ("Attempt(s)") (2003). Where, as here, the offense is completed, the statutory language requires only that the defendant knowin

th Cir.1997); United States v. Meacham, 115 F.3d 1488, 1495 (10th Cir.1997); United States v. Sirois, 87 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir.1996); United States v. Campbell, 49 F.3d 1079, 1082-83 (5th Cir.1995) ("[I]t is not necessary to a conviction under the [Mann] Act that the sole and single purpose of the transpor

Cir.1997); United States v. Meacham , 115 F.3d 1488, 1495 (10th Cir.1997); United States v. Sirois , 87 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir.1996); United States v. Campbell, 49 F.3d 1079, 1082-83 (5th Cir.1995) ("[I]t is not necessary to a conviction under the [Mann] Act that the sole and single purpose of the transport

e that the defendant "knowingly and willfully intended to commit the offense" — i.e. , that he intended to commit the crime. 11th Cir. Pattern Jury Instr., Special Instr. 11 ("Attempt(s)") (2003). Where, as here, the offense is completed, the statutory language requires only that the defendant knowing

Cir.1997); United States v. Meacham , 115 F.3d 1488, 1495 (10th Cir.1997); United States v. Sirois , 87 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir.1996); United States v. Campbell, 49 F.3d 1079, 1082-83 (5th Cir.1995) ("[I]t is not necessary to a conviction under the [Mann] Act that the sole and single purpose of the transport

e that the defendant "knowingly and willfully intended to commit the offense" — i.e. , that he intended to commit the crime. 11th Cir. Pattern Jury Instr., Special Instr. 11 ("Attempt(s)") (2003). Where, as here, the offense is completed, the statutory language requires only that the defendant knowing

Cir.1997); United States v. Meacham , 115 F.3d 1488, 1495 (10th Cir.1997); United States v. Sirois , 87 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir.1996); United States v. Campbell, 49 F.3d 1079, 1082-83 (5th Cir.1995) ("[I]t is not necessary EFTA02857818 to a conviction under the [Mann] Act that the sole and single purpose o

e that the defendant "knowingly and willfully intended to commit the offense" — i.e. , that he intended to commit the crime. 11th Cir. Pattern Jury Instr., Special Instr. 11 ("Attempt(s)") (2003). Where, as here, the offense is completed, the statutory language requires only that the defendant knowing