Epstein Secrets

Kori Schake April 11, 2014 -- Secretary of State John Kerry's push for Middle East peace has come to this sorry impasse: The Israelis demanding the United States release a traitor before they are willing to proceed with previously agreed releases of Palestinians, and the Palestinians playing for internationa

urled in Washington. According to John McCain: "I travel all around the world and I hear unanimously that the United States is withdrawing and that the United States' influence is on the wane and that bad things are going to happen, and they are happening." The charge of retreat is a potent one. It's also a compl

enty years, when Netanyahu's Likud was out of power, Abbas conducted direct negotiations with Israeli leaders: first with Labor's Justice Minister, Yossi Beilin, in 1995, and then with centrist Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, in 2008. Twice, Abbas endorsed principles of action on the core issues proposed by Isr

I think they take those costs, and potential =nintended consequences, very seriously. GOLDBERG: Do you think Israel could cause damage to itself in Americ= by preempting the Iranian nuclear program militarily? PRESIDENT OBAMA: I don't know how it plays in America. I think we in=the United States instin

the history of U.S.-Israeli relations where you have a government from th= right in Israel at the same time you have a center-left government in the=United States, and so I think what happens then is that a lot of political interpretations of our relationshi= get projected onto this. But one thing that I have

a percentage=point, leaving the Israeli left with the feeling that the assassin had won—and casting a dark cloud over=the fate of the peace process. Yossi Beilin, who served as a member of Per=s's cabinet at the time, recalls feeling bereft, "really broken," wh=n results were announced. Yet he found Peres rem

um. There is no doubt they are isolated. They have a very ingrown political EFTA00719567 system. They are founded and fueled on hostility towards the United States, Israel, and to some degree the West. And they have shown themselves willing to go outside international norms and international rules to achieve t

percentage point, leaving the Israeli left with the feeling that the assassin had won—and casting a dark cloud over the fate of the peace process. Yossi Beilin, who served as a member of Peres's cabinet at the time, recalls feeling bereft, "really broken," when results were announced. Yet he found Peres re

r mind the burning city, goes the logic; we've got our hands full building this Potemkin village. The Arab revolutions demand bold initiatives from the United States and any other outside power seeking to influence their outcome. Airstrikes to break the Syrian military would have been one; a cutoff of military a

would be discussed at an international conference. Finally, the final peace agreement would be signed. Some weeks after the roadmap was proposed, Yossi Beilin, one of the Israeli negotiators of the Oslo accords and former Palestinian Information Minister Yasser Abed Rabbo agreed upon an unofficial plan in

tment, but at some point the same forces of change that were transforming the rest of the world were bound to visit there as well. There was no way the United States would ever have pushed meaningful reform, let alone broken our ties with the authoritarians, unless the street did it for us. Great powers don't pi

_(In a Very Unhappy Middle East), Aaron David Miller Foreign Policy Dear Abu Mazen: End This Farce (An open letter to the Palestinian leader) Yossi Beilin Foreign Affairs God, Bush, and Obama Andrew Preston EFTA00686674 Article 6. The Economist Article 7. Anicic I. China's military rise Sp

des that it was likely to go wrong. Not only were the aides right. Assad had ended up delivering an extraordinary personal rebuff to the President of the United States. Now, I was again asking President Clinton for a summit, and I knew Madeleine Albright, Dennis Ross and others would be highly sceptical. “I understa

e city of Jerusalem. I was not opposed to the Palestinians calling Jerusalem the capital of their state. But even in follow-up talks after Oslo, when Yossi Beilin and Abu Mazen had explored avenues toward a possible resolution of the Jerusalem question, the maximum understanding was that Israel might expand the

des that it was likely to go wrong. Not only were the aides right. Assad had ended up delivering an extraordinary personal rebuff to the President of the United States. Now, I was again asking President Clinton for a summit, and I knew Madeleine Albright, Dennis Ross and others would be highly sceptical. "I understa

e city of Jerusalem. I was not opposed to the Palestinians calling Jerusalem the capital of their state. But even in follow-up talks after Oslo, when Yossi Beilin and Abu Mazen had explored avenues toward a possible resolution of the Jerusalem question, the maximum understanding was that Israel might expand the

Press, at the address above You must not circulate this work in any other form and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data ava

uent talks between the parties. In 1992, as the director of the Norwegian research institute Fafo, I initiated, together with then member of Knesset Yossi Beilin, secret talks between him and local Palestinian leader Faisal Husseini, at the American Colony Hotel in Jerusalem. These talks, which were facilitate