Epstein Secrets

ense may make arguments attacking the credibility of victims, the Government is free to argue that these witnesses are, in fact, victims of a crime. Cl United States v. Thai, 29 F.3d 785, 807 (2d Cir. 1994) (explaining that prosecutors may also "respond to an argument that impugns its integrity or the integrity

y this form of testimony, as explained above. To the extent Raymond stands for such a broad proposition, it is contrary to the law of this Circuit. See United States v. Joseph, 542 F.3d 13, 21-22 (2d Cir. 2008), abrogated on other grounds as recognized by United States v. Ferguson, 676 F.3d 260, 276 n.14 (2d Cir.

and the facts underlying the schemes alleged in the indictment"), vacated in part on other grounds 285 F. App'x 797 (2d Cir. 2008); United States v. Nektalov, 325 F. Supp. 2d 367, 370 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) ("[T]he transactions took place as early as three years prior to the charged conspiracy and appear to inv

utweighed by its prejudicial effect; and (4) the trial court gave an appropriate limiting instruction to the jury if so requested by the defendant." United States v. Arroyo, 600 F. App'x II, 13 (2d Cir. 2015) (summary order) (quoting United States v. Lanam, 369 F.3d 153, 156 (2d Cir. 2004). are offered for im

n which apparently relied in reaching her conclusions. This Court should reject the government's untimely effort to save testimony from exclusion. See United States v. Lewis, 818 F. App'x 74, 79 (2d Cir. 2020) (unpublished) (affirming exclusion of defendant's proffered expert evidence "that did not adhere to th

oceed under Rule 4O4(b)." United States v. Townsend, No. SI 06 CR. 34 (JFK), 2007 WL 1288597, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 1, 2007) (citing United States v. Nektalov, 325 F. Supp. 2d 367, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)). evidence should also be excluded under Rule 404(b) and Rule 403. As argued in our initial Motion, evid

elf pointed out, the characteristics of the modus operandi must be "sufficiently idiosyncratic to permit a fair inference of a pattern's existence." United States v. Sliker, 751 F.2d 477, 487 (2d Cir. 1984)); see also United States v. Walla, No. 14—CR- 213 (MICE), 2014 WL 3734522, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2014

08) 9 United States v. McCallum, 584 F.3d 471 (2d Cir. 2009) 5, 6, 11 United States v. Mills, 895 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1990) 12 United States v. Nektalov, 325 F. Supp. 2d 367 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) 6, 8, 9, 10 United States v. Pascarella, 84 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 1996) 11 United States v. Sliker, 751 F.2d 4

elf pointed out, the characteristics of the modus operandi must be "sufficiently idiosyncratic to permit a fair inference of a pattern's existence." United States v. Sliker, 751 F.2d 477, 487 (2d Cir. 1984)); see also United States v. Walla, No. 14—CR- 213 (MICE), 2014 WL 3734522, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2014

08) 9 United States v. McCallum, 584 F.3d 471 (2d Cir. 2009) 5, 6, 11 United States v. Mills, 895 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1990) 12 United States v. Nektalov, 325 F. Supp. 2d 367 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) 6, 8, 9, 10 United States v. Pascarella, 84 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 1996) 11 United States v. Sliker, 751 F.2d 4