Epstein Secrets

istent with how our circuit and others have articulated the doctrine. See, e.g., United States v. Villasenor. 608 F.3d 467. 471-72 (9th Cir.2010); United Stales v. Yang, 286 F.3d 940.945-46 (7th Cir.2002); United States v. Hyde, 37 F.3d 116. 120 n. 2 (3d Cit 1994); United States v. Santiago, 837 F.2d 1545.

010). Reasonable suspicion is required precisely because the individual has regained an expectation of privacy by moving away from the border. See United Slates v. Villasenor. 608 F.3d 467.471-72 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, —U.S., 131 S.Ct. 547. 178 L.Ed.2d 401 (2010); United States v. Whiting. 781 F.2d 692.

bing a functional border search and those describing an extended border search, not in defining the standard for a search at the border. See, e.g., United States v. Cardona, 769 F.2d 625, 628 (9th Cir.1985) ("We have recently recognized the difficulty of making sharp distinctions between searches at the func

he Court has expressed support for the deterrence value of suspicionless searches of a routine nature, such as vehicle checkpoints near the border. See United States v. Maninez— Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976) ("We note here only the substantiality of the public interest in the p

ion is consistent with how our circuit and others have articulated the doctrine. See, e.g., United States v. Villasenor. 608 F.3d 467. 471-72 (9th Cir.2010); United Stales v. Yang, 286 F.3d 940.945-46 (7th Cir.2002); United States v. Hyde, 37 F.3d 116. 120 n. 2 (3d Cit 1994); United States v. Santiago,

rring admission of plea negotiations; the alleged victims intended to admit the evidence of the plea negotiations to prove violations of the CVRA by the United States, not to be used against the alleged perpetrator. Fed.Rules Evid.Rule 410, 28 U.S.C.A. [12] Federal Civil Procedure 170A f=1604(2) 170A Federal Civ

s. United States I. Cartwright, 413 F.3d 1295, 1299 (11th Cir.2005). We also review de novo the interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See United States I. Campa, 459 F.3d 1121, 1174 (11th Cir.2006); Pickett I. Iowa Beef Processors, 209 F.3d 1276, 1279 (11th Cir.2000). And the issue of whether to r

party who is likely "to forgo suf- fering a contempt citation and appealing in favor of disclosure," United States I. Krane, 625 F.3d 568, 573 (9th Cir.2010). As the Seventh Circuit explained about the scope of the Perlman doctrine after Mohawk,"[o]nly when the person who as- serts a privilege is a nonl

equired `only where the charges of the indictment are so general that they do not advise the defendant of the specific acts of which he is accused!" United States v. Walsh, 194 F.3d 37, 47 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Torres, 901 F.2d at 234); see United States v. Mahabub, No. 13 Cr. 908 (MN), 2014 WL 4243657, at *

) material reasonably in advance of trial, and will engage in good faith discussions with the defense regardinga schedule for pretrial disclosures. See United States v. Sergentakis, No. 05 Cr. 230 (JFK), 2005 WL 1994014, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2005) ("18 U.S.C. § 3500(b) calls for production of Government wit

se at trial." United States v. Torres, 901 F.2d 205, 234 (2d Cir. 1990), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Marcus, 628 F.3d 36, 41 (2d Cir.2010) (emphasis added) (internal quotation mark omitted). Accordingly, "[a] bill of particulars is required `only where the charges of the indictment are

equired 'only where the charges of the indictment are so general that they do not advise the defendant of the specific acts of which he is accused!" United States v. Walsh, 194 F.3d 37, 47 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Torres, 901 F.2d at 234); see United States v. Mahabub, No. 13 Cr. 908 (AJN), 2014 WL 4243657, at

material reasonably in advance of trial, and will engage in good faith discussions with the defense regarding a schedule for pretrial disclosures. See United States v. Sergentakis, No. 05 Cr. 230 (JFK), 2005 WL 1994014, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2005) C' 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b) calls for production of Government wi

se at trial." United States v. Torres, 901 F.2d 205, 234 (2d Cir. 1990), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Marcus, 628 F.3d 36, 41 (2d Cir.2010) (emphasis added) (internal quotation mark omitted). Accordingly, "[a] bill of particulars is required 'only where the charges of the indictment are

equired 'only where the charges of the indictment are so general that they do not advise the defendant of the specific acts of which he is accused!" United States v. Walsh, 194 F.3d 37, 47 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Torres, 901 F.2d at 234); see United States v. Mahabub, No. 13 Cr. 908 (AJN), 2014 WL 4243657, at

material reasonably in advance of trial, and will engage in good faith discussions with the defense regarding a schedule for pretrial disclosures. See United States v. Sergentakis, No. 05 Cr. 230 (JFK), 2005 WL 1994014, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2005) C' 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b) calls for production of Government wi

se at trial." United States v. Torres, 901 F.2d 205, 234 (2d Cir. 1990), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Marcus, 628 F.3d 36, 41 (2d Cir.2010) (emphasis added) (internal quotation mark omitted). Accordingly, "[a] bill of particulars is required 'only where the charges of the indictment are

tation omitted). "It has been clear for a generation that `Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights ... [that] may not be vicariously asserted."' United States v. Haqq, 278 F.3d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1978)). Accordingly, a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights

nt may violate the Fifth Amendment (or another right). In certain circumstances, a private entity may be deemed to be acting as a government agent. See United States v. Stein, 541 F.3d 130, 146 (2d Cir. 2008) ("Actions of a private entity are attributable to the State if there is a sufficiently close nexus betwe

se at trial." United States v. Torres, 901 F.2d 205, 234 (2d Cir. 1990), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Marcus, 628 F.3d 36, 41 (2d Cir.2010) (emphasis added) (internal quotation mark omitted). Accordingly, "[a] bill of particulars is required `only where the charges of the indictment are

equired `only where the charges of the indictment are so general that they do not advise the defendant of the specific acts of which he is accused.' United States v. Walsh, 194 F.3d 37, 47 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Torres, 901 F.2d at 234); see United States v. Mahabub, No. 13 Cr. 908 (AJN), 2014 WL 4243657, at

material reasonably in advance of trial, and will engage in good faith discussions with the defense regarding a schedule for pretrial disclosures. See United States v. Sergentakis, No. 05 Cr. 230 (JFK), 2005 WL 1994014, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2005) ("18 U.S.C. § 3500(b) calls for production of Government wit

se at trial." United States v. Torres, 901 F.2d 205, 234 (2d Cir. 1990), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Marcus, 628 F.3d 36, 41 (2d Cir.2010) (emphasis added) (internal quotation mark omitted). Accordingly, "[a] bill of particulars is required `only where the charges of the indictment are

rts an individual who has not attained the age of 18 years in inter- state or foreign commerce, or in any common- wealth. territory or possession of the United States, with intent that the individual engage in prostitution, or in any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal of- fense, s

or would have differed substan- tially. See, e.g., United States v. Snow, supra, 507 F.2d at 24; United States v. Farley, 607 F.3d 1294, 1335 (11th Cir.2010); United States v. Meacham, supra, 115 F.3d at 1495.96. We can place the blame for judicial preoccupa- tion with the word "dominant" on the Supreme