Epstein Secrets

"United States"); United States v. Bruno, 159 F. Supp. 3d 311, 321 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) ("The Court disagrees with Defendant's argument that the phrase `United States' shows an intent to bind all United States Attorney's Offices. Rather, the plea agreement covers only Defendant's liability in the SDFL."). As the S

Cir. Apr. 26, 2002) (summary order) (plea agreement does not bind other districts "even if the plea agreement purports to bind `the Government' or the "United States"); United States v. Bruno, 159 F. Supp. 3d 311, 321 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) ("The Court disagrees with Defendant's argument that the phrase `United States'

r v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) 56 Thom v. Ashcroft, 369 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2004) 47 Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112 (1970) 48 United State v. Nader, 425 F. Supp. 3d 619 (E.D. Va. 2019) passim United States v. Ahmed, 992 F. Supp. 682 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) 166 United States v. Ahmed, No.

ntobello v. United States, No. 94 Cr. (RPP), 1998 WL 113950 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 1998) 21 Sch. Dist. No. 7, 167 F.3d 784 (2d Cir. 1999) 61 SEC v. TheStreetcom, 273 F.3d 222 (2d Cir. 2001) 109, 113 viii EFTA00103007 Silver, 15 Cr. 93 (VEC) 275 Skelos, 15 Cr. 317 (KMW) 275 Smith v. Maryland, 442

.. . it defines the basic elements of a fair trial largely through the several provisions of the Sixth Amendment."' Cap/in & Drysdale, Chartered v. UnitedStates, 491 U.S. 617, 633 (1989) (citations omitted). 'The right of an accused in a criminal trial to due process is, in essence, the right to a fair oppor

tation omitted). "It has been clear for a generation that 'Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights ... [that] may not be vicariously asserted.'" United States v. Haqq, 278 F.3d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Rakers v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1978)). Accordingly, a defendant's Fourth Amendment right

nt may violate the Fifth Amendment (or another right). In certain circumstances, a private entity may be deemed to be acting as a government agent. See United States v. Stein, 541 F.3d 130, 146 (2d Cir. 2008) ("Actions of a private entity are attributable to the State if there is a sufficiently close nexus betwe

such pre-existing documents not created in reliance on a protective order,which do not trigger the Martindell presumption in the Second Circuit, see TheStreetcom, 273 F.3d at 234-235; Davis, 702 F.2d at 422. Maxwell's arguments also do not extend to ositions, why 8I EFTA00100048 2. Maxwell's Fourth Amen

NDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF INTERVENORS' MOTIONS FOR LEAVE TO INTERVENE AND TO MODIFY THE PROTECTIVE ORDER STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP 1114 Avenue of the Americas New York, New York 10036 (212) 506-3900 October 5, 2017 CONFIDENTIAL - FILED UNDER SEAL EFTA00805389 TABLE OF CONTENTS PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

rder 1. The Court Has Broad Discretion to Modify the Protective Order This Court has broad power to modify existing protective orders. S.E.C. v. TheStreetcom, 273 F.3d 222, 231 (2d Cir. 2001). Before modifying a protective order, the Court must first determine if the parties to the original order "reasona