Epstein Secrets

utweighed by its prejudicial effect; and (4) the trial court gave an appropriate limiting instruction to the jury if so requested by the defendant." United States v. Arroyo, 600 F. App'x II, 13 (2d Cir. 2015) (summary order) (quoting United States v. Lanam, 369 F.3d 153, 156 (2d Cir. 2004). are offered for im

n which apparently relied in reaching her conclusions. This Court should reject the government's untimely effort to save testimony from exclusion. See United States v. Lewis, 818 F. App'x 74, 79 (2d Cir. 2020) (unpublished) (affirming exclusion of defendant's proffered expert evidence "that did not adhere to th

-NGG-VMS, 2019 WL 2212639 (E.D.N.Y. May 22, 20, 23 Raymond, 700 F. Supp. 2d 142 (D. Me. 2010) 20, 21, 22 Rigas, 490 F.3d 208 (2d. Cir. 2007) 14 Salmonese, 352 F.3d 608 (2d Cir. 2003) 14 Schneider, No. CRIM.A. 10-29, 2010 WL 3734055 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 22, 2010) 20, Sena, No. 19-CR-01432, 2021 WL 4129247

tation omitted). "It has been clear for a generation that `Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights ... [that] may not be vicariously asserted."' United States v. Haqq, 278 F.3d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1978)). Accordingly, a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights

nt may violate the Fifth Amendment (or another right). In certain circumstances, a private entity may be deemed to be acting as a government agent. See United States v. Stein, 541 F.3d 130, 146 (2d Cir. 2008) ("Actions of a private entity are attributable to the State if there is a sufficiently close nexus betwe

and at least one timely overt act is committed in furtherance of the conspiracy within the applicable statute of limitations. See United States v. Salmonese, 352 F.3d 608, 614 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 396-97 (1957)); United States v. Rutkoske, 506 F.3d 170, 174-75

tation omitted). "It has been clear for a generation that `Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights ... [that] may not be vicariously asserted."' United States v. Haqq, 278 F.3d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1978)). Accordingly, a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights

nt may violate the Fifth Amendment (or another right). In certain circumstances, a private entity may be deemed to be acting as a government agent. See United States v. Stein, 541 F.3d 130, 146 (2d Cir. 2008) ("Actions of a private entity are attributable to the State if there is a sufficiently close nexus betwe

and at least one timely overt act is committed in furtherance of the conspiracy within the applicable statute of limitations. See United States v. Salmonese, 352 F.3d 608, 614 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing Grunwald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 396-97 (1957)); United States v. Rutkoske, 506 F.3d 170, 174-75

elf pointed out, the characteristics of the modus operandi must be "sufficiently idiosyncratic to permit a fair inference of a pattern's existence." United States v. Sliker, 751 F.2d 477, 487 (2d Cir. 1984)); see also United States v. Walla, No. 14—CR- 213 (MICE), 2014 WL 3734522, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2014

es v. Bagaric, 706 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1983) 6, 7, 8 United States v. Benussi, 216 F. Supp. 2d 299 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), of 'd sub nom. United States v. Salmonese, 352 F.3d 608 (2d Cir. 2003) 8 United States v. Carboni, 204 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 2000) 6 United States v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1992)

ns the admissibility of evidence of prior or subsequent tad acts'—evidence of `crimes, wrongs, or acts' other than those charged in the indictment." United States v. Curley, 639 F.3d 50, 56 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)). "The rule prohibits the admission of such evidence if it `prove[s] the cha

7) 8 Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607 (2003) 7 United States v. Benussi, 216 F. Supp. 2d 299 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), affd sub nom. United States v. Salmonese, 352 F.3d 608 (2d Cir. 2003) 7 United States v. Curley, 639 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 2011) 10 United States v. Greebel, No. 15-cr-637 (KAM), 2017 WL

elf pointed out, the characteristics of the modus operandi must be "sufficiently idiosyncratic to permit a fair inference of a pattern's existence." United States v. Sliker, 751 F.2d 477, 487 (2d Cir. 1984)); see also United States v. Walla, No. 14—CR- 213 (MICE), 2014 WL 3734522, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2014

es v. Bagaric, 706 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1983) 6, 7, 8 United States v. Benussi, 216 F. Supp. 2d 299 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), of 'd sub nom. United States v. Salmonese, 352 F.3d 608 (2d Cir. 2003) 8 United States v. Carboni, 204 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 2000) 6 United States v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1992)