Epstein Secrets

ther and son), and Libya's Muammar al-Qaddafi. America sought to check and constrain their power, even removing one through invasion. But at times, the United States found common ground with them too. (See: cooperation with Saddam against the Iranian mullahs, and dancing with Assad on the peace process.) As pure

TA00660287 From Washington's vantage point, the Arab world wasn't so much divided into countries as it was broken down into personalities. Each of Americas' authoritarians had a role to play and a dramatic persona to accompany it. There was the good King Hussein, the wily but indispensable Arafat, the

depended to help protect its interests. They were constant, if not always agreeable, companions. Egypt's Mubarak, Jordan's King Hussein, Tunisia's Ben Ali, Yemen's Ali Saleh, Morocco's King Hassan II, Saudi Arabia's kings Fand and Abdullah. The PLO's Yasir Arafat rounded out the group photo. America'

s, the Obama administration remained unwilling to come to terms with new realities. In the third presidential debate in Boca Raton, Obama said that the United States stood with the Tunisian people "earlier than just about any other country." This is not quite true: As late as January 12, two days before Tunisian

ople "earlier than just about any other country." This is not quite true: As late as January 12, two days before Tunisian strongman Zein al-Abidine Ben Ali fell, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton asserted -- twice -- that the United States was "not taking sides." It would be nearly impossible, conside

process at Geneva, to seek a political transition in Syria. I'll give you an example: On Nov. 21, representatives of Iran, Saudi Arabia, Russia and the United States met with Baroness Valerie Amos, the U.N. undersecretary for EFTA00706407 humanitarian affairs, to discuss possible relief efforts. So I've wondere

There are disagreements in the party on what decisions to make and compromises to give. In the party congress, I wasn't elected by 99 percent, like Ben Ali. Seventy percent voted for me. Maybe this 70 percent has gone down a bit because of the compromises we had to give, but I think the majority of the

permanent legacy of the Arab Spring. This question isn't trivial, as the political fortunes of Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Lebanon, and the interests of the United States, hang in the balance. A window onto the question of whether it will be political Islam or secular nationalism that will emerge strengthened from th

ab Spring still an appropriate moniker for describing the series of uprisings that started with the overthrow of Tunisian president Zine el Abidine Ben Ali and then spread eastward to engulf Libya, Egypt, Syria and Yemen? Or given how the region has evolved over the past couple of EFTA_R1_00441474 EF

lowed by fuller agreements. Both Tehran and Washington are downplaying expectations for the May 23 Baghdad negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 (the United States, Russia, China, Britain, France, and Germany). Indeed, the prospects for eventual success are uncertain. If Iran is truly prepared to deal, and if

Saudi Arabia was uneasy with 2011's outpouring of people power from the start, lest it flow into the kingdom as well. First, when Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali fled Tunisia, he and his family were welcomed in Saudi Arabia. Then, Riyadh worked EFTA_R1_02205167 EFTA02721247 to prevent the toppling of the

gy market. Not surprisingly, most revolved around the Persian Gulf petro- EFTA00586505 18 monarchies, although there are two interesting ones for the United States: 1. Can Saudi Arabia's tradition of ultra-secretiveness survive the highly unpredictable unrest? The Saudis are so guarded that they will barely t

nt was authoritarian but also determinedly secular and pro- Western. The cracks, however, were larger than anyone thought: President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali had carefully hidden the extent to which illness had weakened his control of the government; his ties with other centers of power, such as the mili

d like a giant game of whack-a-mole, with a new problem popping up daily, was inevitable. And so was the variety of U.S. responses. In Bahrain, where the United States had established the headquarters of the U.S. Navy's 5th Fleet, and in Yemen, where counterterrorism is king, interests trumped values. You didn't hea

neocons outside clamored for action. This group of realists includes the president, who knows his options on Syria aren't great. He's being told that American leverage isn't great and that if he calls for Assad's head and the Syrian despot survives, he'll have lost access to a key player in the region. And

pproach to the protests. Makhlouf, in turn, needed no authorization whatsoever. What Shaaban said was likely intended to be interpreted in the United States as a marginally soft statement by Bashar Assad. In contrast, Makhlouf offered the harsher alternative if the president's approach was rejected by the

ation approach to the protests. Makhlouf, in turn, needed no authorization whatsoever. What Shaaban said was likely intended to be interpreted in the United States as a marginally soft statement by Bashar Assad. In contrast, Makhlouf offered the harsher alternative if the president's approach was rejected

nder of the defeat of jihadi ideology in an Arab world being transformed by people power. Another variable has been the response: French support for Ben Ali was embarrassing; the US was praising Mubarak days before he departed. Muammar Gaddafi had no friends - and the Arab League was crucial in providing

llies-in-arms at the ready, or go it alone, even actively dissuading Israel from joining an attack? What would the domestic political situation be in the United States? Would there be an internal political consensus to act, or would there be an active, acrimonious debate? Would the American people be prepared for th

his leads to yet another layer of complexity and uncertainty: Whose war would this be? A U.S.-Iranian war would probably not be fought by the United States and Iran alone. Each would have partners or allies, both willing and not-so-willing. Pre-conflict commitments, longstanding HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_018107

orld. This leads to yet another layer of complexity and uncertainty: Whose war would this be? A U.S.-Iranian war would probably not be fought by the United States and Iran alone. Each would have partners or allies, both willing and not-so-willing. Pre-conflict commitments, longstanding HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_0

thousands times, boiled over in a month of demonstrations against Tunisian President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali. To the amazement of the Arab world, Mr. Ben Ali fled the country when the military declined to back him by brutally putting down the demonstrations. Spurred on by televised images and YouTube vide

authority and hold free elections, with the army ensuring the country's security. The Assad clan is trying to convince the outside world, including the United States and the European Union, that the regime's fall could lead to chaos and sectarian wars. It claims the opposition is either too HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023470

ited States was primarily interested in stability. Despite brave speeches on democracy by both Condeleezza Rice and Barack Obama in Cairo, the United States actually pulled its punches in pushing serious democratic reform on Egypt, particularly after the Hamas electoral victory in Gaza in 2006. Nonetheles

The United States was primarily interested in stability. Despite brave speeches on democracy by both Condeleezza Rice and Barack Obama in Cairo, the United States actually pulled its punches in pushing serious democratic reform on Egypt, particularly after the Hamas electoral victory in Gaza in 2006. Non

sibly close to double that number - is likely to have a major impact on the regional structure of power. The need to contain pressure from the United States and Israel, for decades the all-consuming concern of Syria's leadership, has suddenly been displaced by an explosion of popular protest highlighting

and possibly close to double that number - is likely to have a major impact on the regional structure of power. The need to contain pressure from the United States and Israel, for decades the all-consuming concern of Syria's leadership, has suddenly been displaced by an explosion of popular protest highli

st. It's over: Enough of the nameless graves that whisper of horror, enough of the 20th-century police states in the 21st-century. Yes, it's over for Ben Ali and for Mubarak. It's over for Qaddafi, yes it is. How far it's over for the other Arab despots and autocrats, whether of the oxymoronic "republics"