Epstein Secrets

ssue is a personal compulsion of =etanyahu is reflected in estimates that even within his own cabinet (and e=en with the support of Defense Minister Ehud Barak), a vote in favor of war with Iran might be as close as eight t= six. A former Likud activist who has become a critic of Netanyahu explain=, "Bibi i

nd e=en with the support of Defense Minister Ehud Barak), a vote in favor of war with Iran might be as c

et (and e=en with the support of Defense Minister Ehud Barak), a vote in favor of war with Iran might b

m. The lull=comes after the concentrated warmongering rhetoric associated with the recent visit of Israeli Prime Minister Benjam=n Netanyahu and the AIPAC conference in Washington, and before the opening=in mid-April of the only channel offering a way out of the impasse associa=ed with the Iranian nucl

pecifically wants to define the boundaries of the main settlement blocs where construction would be allowed. Remember that as far back as the 2000 Barak-Arafat negotiations, the Palestinians had expressed a willingness to allow Israel to annex the large settlement blocs as part of a land swap. :2Vl

alks since Mahmoud Abbas met with Prime Minister Ehud Olmert in 2008. Even former U.S. envoy Martin Ind

s effort to form a lobby was in 1972. The National Association of Arab Americans (NAAA) was consciously patterned after its pro-Israel counterpart, AIPAC. In fact, the NAAA even duplicated AIPAC's stationery, changing only the name. More brazen, however, was the nascent lobby's request for help from

nk the prime minister and the defense minister, [Ehud Barak,] feel a profound, historic obligation not

ltation and intelligence coordination around that question, Israel feels more vulnerable. And I think the prime minister and the defense minister, [Ehud Barak,] feel a profound, historic obligation not to put Israel in a position where it cannot act decisively and unilaterally to protect the state of Isra

we say." The 45-minute Oval Office conversation took place less than a week before the president was scheduled to address the annual convention of AIPAC, the pro-Israel lobbying group, and then meet, the next day, with Prime Minister Netanyahu at the White House. In the interview, Obama stated speci

ration has scolded Israel, the charges have been repeated by Turkish officials. November 2011: In advance of meeting with Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak, Mr. Panetta publicly previewed his message. He would warn Mr. Barak against a military strike on Iran's nuclear program: "There are going to be ec

advance of meeting with Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak, Mr. Panetta publicly previewed his message

ma Dan Senor Article 3. The Daily Beast Iran's Clerics Want to Goad Israel Into an Attack Aram Roston Article 4. The Weekly Standard Obama at AIPAC: Determined ... to Win Their Votes Elliott Abrams Article 5. Washington Monthly We Can Live with a Nuclear Iran Paul Pillar Article 6. The Ne

yet. Think 2013. If Israel can't get assurances that the U.S. is prepared to use force, then Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Ehud Barak will act later this year or early next. But for now, there will be no war and certainly no deal over the nuclear issue. And the reason for that is

Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Ehud Barak will act later this year or early next. Bu

e problem, he goes on, is that there is too little trust that the United States will act. He advises that "even statements" could help, but "not to AIPAC;" instead, "a declaration to the Congress, that if the steps the administration is relying upon today ... do not achieve success by the summer of 2

yet. Think 2013. If Israel can't get assurances that the U.S. is prepared to use force, then Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Ehud Barak will act later this year or early next. But for now, there will be no war and certainly no deal over the nuclear issue. And the reason for that is

Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Ehud Barak will act later this year or early next. B

e problem, he goes on, is that there is too little trust that the United States will act. He advises that "even statements" could help, but "not to AIPAC;" instead, "a declaration to the Congress, that if the steps the administration is relying upon today ... do not achieve success by the summer of 2

lks, conducted in 2008 under then-Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, Israel offered to withdraw from roughly 9

uclear facilities becomes necessary. Yet this is a debate about the American national interest, and most American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) supporters do not want it to degenerate into a debate about Israel. Most agree with former Israeli Ambassador Itamar Rabinovitch that, "It's bad f