Epstein Secrets

r Victim-2 to testify about her abuse twice. Cf. Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 210 (1987) (recognizing

ictim-3's experiences in the Indictment "may not be stricken" "regardless of how prejudicial the language is .. ." Scarpa, 913 F.2d at 1013 (quoting DePahna, 461 F. Supp. at 797). Finally, even if Minor Victim-3's experiences did not constitute direct evidence of the crimes charged—which they do—this s

r Victim-2 to testify about her abuse twice. Cf. Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 210 (1987) (recognizing

ictim-3's experiences in the Indictment "may not be stricken" "regardless of how prejudicial the language is .. ." Scarpa, 913 F.2d at 1013 (quoting DePahna, 461 F. Supp. at 797). Finally, even if Minor Victim-3's experiences did not constitute direct evidence of the crimes charged—which they do—this s

s v. Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S. 102 (2007) 150, 155 xviii EFTA00095085 United States v. Ricco, 549 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1977) 42 United States v. Richardson, 512 F.2d 105 (3d Cir. 1975) 36 United States v. Richardson, 537 F.3d 951 (8th Cir. 2008) 200 United States v. Rioux, 930 F. Supp. 1558 (D. Co

17 Cr. 585 (WHP), 2018 WL 740727 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2018) 114 United States v. Delacruz, 970 F. Supp. 2d 199 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 53 United States v. DePahna, 461 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) 159, 164 United States v. Dewar, 489 F. Supp. 2d 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 112 United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52

r Victim-2 to testify about her abuse twice. See Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 210 (1987) (recognizing

ant to the charge, then regardless of how prejudicial the language is, it may not be stricken." Id. (brackets in original) (quoting United States v. DePahna, 461 F. Supp. 778, 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)); see also United States v. Mulder, 273 F.3d 91, 99 (2d Cir. 2001). "This standard is an exacting one, and o