Epstein Secrets

e statutory provision," not by outside objectives, such as those facilitating successful prosecution. See Cuellar, supra, Slip op. at 7. As Justice Alito stated in his concurring opinion, the government must prove not just the "effect" of the secretive transportation, but also that "petitioner knew th

it has identified. Because the information provided by these women goes directly to the question of Mr. Epstein's guilt or innocence, it is classic Brady information. We understand that the U.S. Attorney might not want to disclose impeachment information about their witnesses prior to a charge or dur

ving one of these effects was a design (i.e. purpose) of the transportation" of currency. Cuellar v. United States, supra, 553 U.S., Slip op. At I (Alito, J. concurring). Similarly, it is not enough that one effect of a communication scheduling a visit between Mr. Epstein and a minor was that there mi

it has identified. Because the information provided by these women goes directly to the question of Mr. Epstein's guilt or innocence, it is classic Brady information. We understand that the U.S. Attorney might not want to disclose impeachment information about their witnesses prior to a charge or dur

h Hubbard complains that Nucor promoted him. See J.A. 1097; cf. Kalamazoo Cnty. Rd. Comm'n v. Deleon, 135 S. Ct. 783, 784, 190 L. Ed. 2d 887 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) ("Respondent's supervisors did not violate federal law by granting him the transfer that he sought and t

t's alternatives are most relevant to this case. A specific employment practice or policy can comprise affirmative acts or inaction. Cf. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 881 (9th Cir. 1991) (explaining an employer's responsibility to act to rectify a hostile or offensive work environment under Title VI

s it has identified. Because the information provided by these women goes directly to the question of Mr. Epstein’s guilt or innocence, it is classic Brady information. We understand that the U.S. Attorney might not want to disclose impeachment information about their witnesses prior to a charge or durin

ive statutory provision,” not by outside objectives, such as those facilitating successful prosecution. See Cuellar, supra, Slip op. at 7. As Justice Alito stated in his concurring opinion, the government must prove not just the “effect” of the secretive transportation, but also that “petitioner knew tha