Epstein Secrets

ated into reports (which had a distinctive blue stripe to signify their impor- tance) that had been provided to Ronald Reagan, George H. W. Bush, and Bill Clinton. Even more shocking, in tracing the path of this disinformation, the inspector general found that the “senior CIA @ officers responsible for these r

9780451494566_2p_all_r.indd 215 @ 9/30/16 8:13AM | | HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_019703 216 | HOW AMERICA LOST ITS SECRETS tions to private companies, but the Clinton administration in 1996 had privatized background checks for government employees requiring security clearances. The idea, backed by Vice President Al

e entirely hidden, is kept veiled, as far as is possible, to increase the value of the coup. “The final move in any sophisticated intelligence game,” Angleton told me in relation to espionage intelligence, is “obscuring a success.” Following Angleton’s precept, the Russian or Chinese intelli- gence service

“The final move in any sophisticated intelligence game,” Angleton told me in relation to espionage intelligence, is “obscuring a success.” Following Angleton’s precept, the Russian or Chinese intelli- gence services, if they had a role in acquiring the product of the self- described “single point of failur

of undelivered NSA documents found in his home, @ the investigation was never able to assess the total extent of the KGB penetration of NSA secrets. (Angleton suspected Dunlap was mur- dered by the KGB in what he termed a surreptitiously assisted death, to prevent Dunlap from talking to investigators.) The

ch had a distinctive blue stripe to signify their importance, had been provided to the three American Presidents, Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton. Even more shocking, in tracing the path of this disinformation, the Inspector General found that the "senior CIA officers responsible for these repo

spent almost six months negotiating with Hillary Clinton’s State Department a one-on-one summit between Pr

eper program through Poteyev soon after it began. The issue was how to exploit this knowledge. When I was writing my book on international deception, Angleton had pointed out to me that “the business of intelligence services is understanding precisely the relationship of their opposition to them.” His view,

final move in any sophisticated intelligence game,” Angleton told me in relation to espionage intelligence coup, is “obscuring a success.” Following Angleton’s precept the Russian or Chinese intelligence services, if they had a role in acquiring the product of the self-described “single point of failure,”

s of undelivered NSA documents found in his home, the investigation was never able to assess the total extent of the KGB penetration of NSA secrets. (Angleton suspected Dunlap was murdered the KGB, in what he termed a surreptitiously assisted death, to prevent Dunlap from talking to investigators.) The Rus

e he, like any other person accused of a felony, would face the charges against him. Nor was it plausible that President Obama and Secretary Of State Clinton would conspire to trap a perpetrator carrying incredibly valuable national security secrets in Russia. The counterintelligence investigation had lit

run the CIA!” (He was referring to Leon Panetta, President Clinton’s former chief of staff.) Snowden attributed the

970s for my book on deception that intelligence services play by a different set of rules than historians when it comes to their espionage successes. Angleton, a famously baroque thinker himself, impressed on me the complexity of espionage. He said “It’s not enough just to steal a secret. It must be done in