Epstein Secrets

ught "the testimony of all witnesses before any grand jury which investigated this matter which is favorable to this defendant." In its answer to Rich's motion, the Govern- ment stated that it would provide grand jury transcripts only insofar as it was re- quired to do so by 18 U.S.C. . 8500. The tr

tivities that substantially affect interstate commerce. See also United States I Ili 514 U.S. 549, 558-59, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 1 1 L. .2d 626 (1995); Reich, 125 S.Ct. at 2215 (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that *1103 for over thirty years, "our cases have mechanically recited that the Commerce Claus

1 lied *1112 to interstate commerce cases. See 514 U.S. at 558-59, 115 S.Ct. 1624; Morrison, U.S. Page 12 at 609-14, 120 S.Ct. 1740; see also Raich, 125 S.Ct. at 2215 (Scabs, l., concurring) (noting that for over thirty years, "our cases have mechanically recited that the Commerce Clause permi

estic commerce comprised of "three general categories of regulation in which 1 Congress is authorized engage under its com- merce power,"Gonzales Reich, 545U.S. I, ---, 125 S.Ct. 2195, 2205, 16 L.Ed.2d I (2005):(I) the use of the channels of interstate commerce; (2) the instrumentalities of inters

mmerce Clause. As pointed out by the Government, the Su- preme Court once remarked in a case in- volving the delegation of legislative power to the Executive that "(t)he broad state- ment that the federal government can exer- cise no powers except those specifically enumerated in the Constitution, and suc

ce where law mandated consecutive one); Ex parte Rich, 194 S.W.3d 508, 515 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (cou

-Violence v. Pierce, 786 F.2d 1199, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("The power to decide when to investigate, and when to prosecute, lies at the core of the Executive's duty to see the faithful execution of the laws"); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985) ("[t]he decision of a prosecutor in the Executive B

to be sure. Many vegetables and fruits are also rich in potassium. But according to Kris-Etherton, ex

rnment itself. Executive orders have the full force of law when they take authority from a legislative power which grants its power directly to the Executive by the Constitution, or are made pursuant to Acts of Congress that explicitly delegate to the President some degree of discretionary power (delegat

e noted, “This case only resolved with the filthy rich bad guy going to jail because of your dedication

ing decisions, the choice to resolve a case through a non-prosecution agreement or a deferred prosecution agreement “resides fundamentally with the Executive” branch. Id. at 741. OPR found no clear and unambiguous standard in the USAM prohibiting the use of a non- prosecution agreement in the circumsta

48 N.C. 671, 675-76 (1998) (holding that court cannot enforce a plea agreement for concurrent sentence where law mandated consecutive one); Ex parte Rich, 194 S.W.3d 508, 515 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (court cannot enforce an illegal sentence below the statutory range); State v. Mazzone, 212 W.Va. 368,

erogatives. The USAO-SDFL has been actively engaged in this litigation and has filed dozens of pleadings. Any issues regarding interference with the Executive branch have, no doubt, been properly advanced by that Office — and Epstein is simply an interloper who is not free to kibitz on constitutional issu

48 N.C. 671, 675-76 (1998) (holding that court cannot enforce a plea agreement for concurrent sentence where law mandated consecutive one); Ex parte Rich, 194 S.W.3d 508, 515 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (court cannot enforce an illegal sentence below the statutory range); State v. Mazzone, 212 W.Va. 368,

erogatives. The USAO-SDFL has been actively engaged in this litigation and has filed dozens of pleadings. Any issues regarding interference with the Executive branch have, no doubt, been properly advanced by that Office — and Epstein is simply an interloper who is not free to kibitz on constitutional issu