Epstein Secrets

t Systems Workshop (PerAfIS 2008), 2008. MW07. Stephen Morgan and Christopher Winship. Counterfactuals a

hich data and procedure are explicitly identical, and there is just one new active data structure in place of the distinction between AtomSpace and MindAgents Where on this continuum does the "mere learning" end and the "real self-modification" start? In this chapter we consider some mechanisms for "adva

ilation 319 schema learning the learning of schemata carrying out cognitive processes in more specialized, context-dependent ways than the general MindAgents do. Eventually, once a CogPrime instance becomes sufficiently complex and advanced, these cognitive schema may replace the MindAgents altogether, l

ligent Systems Workshop (PerMIS 2008), 2008. W07. Stephen Morgan and Christopher Winship. Counterfactuals a

mpilation 319 schema learning the learning of schemata carrying out cognitive processes in more specialized, context-dependent ways than the general MindAgents do. Eventually, once a CogPrime instance becomes sufficiently complex and advanced, these cognitive schema may replace the MindAgents altogether, lea

which data and procedure are explicitly identical, and there is just one new active data structure in place of the distinction between AtomSpace and MindAgents Where on this continuum does the "mere learning" end and the "real self-modification" start? In this chapter we consider some mechanisms for "advan

Some Al theorists would argue that this division into "feature identification" versus "action selection" is unnecessarily artificial; for instance, Hawkins 11113011 or Arel [ARC09bl might sug- gest to use a single hierarchical neural network to do both of them. But the brain after all t in game theory,

idual cognitive processes. The CogPrime design gravitates more toward the latter approach. though also with some specific mechanisms within various MindAgents; and efforts have been made to have these specific mechanisms modulated by the generic attention allocation structures and dynamics wherever possibl

KSPC13. Dimitri Kartsaklis, Mehrnoosh Sadrzadeh, Stephen Putman, and Bob Coecke. Reasoning about meaning

d effort management frameworks attempt to enforce this, via minimizing the amount of effort spent by the system in getting to a certain conclusion. MindAgents operating primarily on one kind of knowledge (e.g. MOSES, PLN) may for a time seek to follow the shortest paths within their particular correspondin