Epstein Secrets

uthful answer might reasonably be calculated to lead to the discovery of evidence admissible at the trial of the underlying suit." United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1994)); see United States v. Birrell, 470 F.2d 113, 115 n.1 (2d Cir. 1972) (explaining, in the context of a motion to pro

United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131, 135-36 (2d Cir. 1999) (distinguishing the "natural tendency test" from a but-for test); Kross, 14 F.3d at 754 (rejecting, in a civil forfeiture case, the argument that the defendant's true testimony would not itself have justified a forfeitur

ictim-3's experiences in the Indictment "may not be stricken" "regardless of how prejudicial the language is .. ." Scarpa, 913 F.2d at 1013 (quoting DePahna, 461 F. Supp. at 797). Finally, even if Minor Victim-3's experiences did not constitute direct evidence of the crimes charged—which they do—this s

uthful answer might reasonably be calculated to lead to the discovery of evidence admissible at the trial of the underlying suit." United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1994)); see United States v. Birrell, 470 F.2d 113, 115 n.1 (2d Cir. 1972) (explaining, in the context of a motion to pro

United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131, 135-36 (2d Cir. 1999) (distinguishing the "natural tendency test" from a but-for test); Kross, 14 F.3d at 754 (rejecting, in a civil forfeiture case, the argument that the defendant's true testimony would not itself have justified a forfeitur

ictim-3's experiences in the Indictment "may not be stricken" "regardless of how prejudicial the language is .. ." Scarpa, 913 F.2d at 1013 (quoting DePahna, 461 F. Supp. at 797). Finally, even if Minor Victim-3's experiences did not constitute direct evidence of the crimes charged—which they do—this s

v. King, 560 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1977) 44 United States v. Kozel, 19 Cr. 460 (KMW), 2020 WL 4751498 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2020) 155 United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751 (2d Cir. 1994) 122, 148 United States v. LaFlam, 369 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 2004) 166 United States v. Lahey, 967 F. Supp. 2d 698 (S.D

agrees that it will not institute any criminal charges against any potential co-conspirators of Epstein, including but not limited to Sarah Kellen, Adriana Ross, Lesley Groff, or Nadia Marcinkova. NPA at 5; Def. Mot. 1 at 20-21. Aside from the reference to "United States" which, as noted above, is insuffic

17 Cr. 585 (WHP), 2018 WL 740727 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2018) 114 United States v. Delacruz, 970 F. Supp. 2d 199 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 53 United States v. DePahna, 461 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) 159, 164 United States v. Dewar, 489 F. Supp. 2d 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 112 United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52

uthful answer might reasonably be calculated to lead to the discovery of evidence admissible at the trial of the underlying suit." United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1994)); see United States v. Birrell, 470 F.2d 113, 115 n.1 (2d Cir. 1972) (explaining, in the context of a motion to pro

United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131, 135-36 (2d Cir. 1999) (distinguishing the "natural tendency test" from a but-for test); Kross, 14 F.3d at 754 (rejecting, in a civil forfeiture case, the argument that the defendant's true testimony would not itself have justified a forfeitur

ant to the charge, then regardless of how prejudicial the language is, it may not be stricken." Id. (brackets in original) (quoting United States v. DePahna, 461 F. Supp. 778, 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)); see also United States v. Mulder, 273 F.3d 91, 99 (2d Cir. 2001). "This standard is an exacting one, and o