Epstein Secrets

uthful answer might reasonably be calculated to lead to the discovery of evidence admissible at the trial of the underlying suit." United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1994)); see United States v. Birrell, 470 F.2d 113, 115 n.1 (2d Cir. 1972) (explaining, in the context of a motion to pro

United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131, 135-36 (2d Cir. 1999) (distinguishing the "natural tendency test" from a but-for test); Kross, 14 F.3d at 754 (rejecting, in a civil forfeiture case, the argument that the defendant's true testimony would not itself have justified a forfeitur

t analysis, the defendant cites no case for the proposition that the setting in which the statement is made is significant, much less determinative. Cl Broccolo, 797 F. Supp. at 1190 (false statement 145 EFTA00077777 in bankruptcy proceeding). And the cases the defendant cites in which a perjury or false

uthful answer might reasonably be calculated to lead to the discovery of evidence admissible at the trial of the underlying suit." United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1994)); see United States v. Birrell, 470 F.2d 113, 115 n.1 (2d Cir. 1972) (explaining, in the context of a motion to pro

United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131, 135-36 (2d Cir. 1999) (distinguishing the "natural tendency test" from a but-for test); Kross, 14 F.3d at 754 (rejecting, in a civil forfeiture case, the argument that the defendant's true testimony would not itself have justified a forfeitur

t analysis, the defendant cites no case for the proposition that the setting in which the statement is made is significant, much less determinative. Cl Broccolo, 797 F. Supp. at 1190 (false statement 145 EFTA00039592 in bankruptcy proceeding). And the cases the defendant cites in which a perjury or false

uthful answer might reasonably be calculated to lead to the discovery of evidence admissible at the trial of the underlying suit." United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1994)); see United States v. Birrell, 470 F.2d 113, 115 n.1 (2d Cir. 1972) (explaining, in the context of a motion to pro

United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131, 135-36 (2d Cir. 1999) (distinguishing the "natural tendency test" from a but-for test); Kross, 14 F.3d at 754 (rejecting, in a civil forfeiture case, the argument that the defendant's true testimony would not itself have justified a forfeitur

t analysis, the defendant cites no case for the proposition that the setting in which the statement is made is significant, much less determinative. Cl Broccolo, 797 F. Supp. at 1190 (false statement in bankruptcy proceeding). And the cases the defendant cites in which a perjury or false statements count wa

uthful answer might reasonably be calculated to lead to the discovery of evidence admissible at the trial of the underlying suit." United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1994)); see United States v. Bitrell, 470 F.2d 113, 115 n.1 (2d Cir. 1972) (explaining, in the context of a motion to pro

United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131, 135-36 (2d Cir. 1999) (distinguishing the "natural tendency test" from a but-for test); Kross, 14 F.3d at 754 (rejecting, in a civil forfeiture case, the argument that the defendant's true testimony would not itself have justified a forfeitur

t analysis, the defendant cites no case for the proposition that the setting in which the statement is made is significant, much less determinative. Cl Broccolo, 797 F. Supp. at 1190 (false statement 145 EFTA00103170 in bankruptcy proceeding). And the cases the defendant cites in which a perjury or false