Epstein Secrets

uthful answer might reasonably be calculated to lead to the discovery of evidence admissible at the trial of the underlying suit." United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1994)); see United States v. Birrell, 470 F.2d 113, 115 n.1 (2d Cir. 1972) (explaining, in the context of a motion to pro

United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131, 135-36 (2d Cir. 1999) (distinguishing the "natural tendency test" from a but-for test); Kross, 14 F.3d at 754 (rejecting, in a civil forfeiture case, the argument that the defendant's true testimony would not itself have justified a forfeitur

automatically mean that the question is impermissibly vague and can never form the basis of a perjury charge. See, e.g., H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 593, 607 (1958) ("A legal rule forbids you to take a vehicle into the public park. Plainly this forbids an automobile,

uthful answer might reasonably be calculated to lead to the discovery of evidence admissible at the trial of the underlying suit." United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1994)); see United States v. Birrell, 470 F.2d 113, 115 n.1 (2d Cir. 1972) (explaining, in the context of a motion to pro

United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131, 135-36 (2d Cir. 1999) (distinguishing the "natural tendency test" from a but-for test); Kross, 14 F.3d at 754 (rejecting, in a civil forfeiture case, the argument that the defendant's true testimony would not itself have justified a forfeitur

automatically mean that the question is impermissibly vague and can never form the basis of a perjury charge. See, e.g., H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 593, 607 (1958) ("A legal rule forbids you to take a vehicle into the public park. Plainly this forbids an automobile,

uthful answer might reasonably be calculated to lead to the discovery of evidence admissible at the trial of the underlying suit." United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1994)); see United States v. Bitrell, 470 F.2d 113, 115 n.1 (2d Cir. 1972) (explaining, in the context of a motion to pro

United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131, 135-36 (2d Cir. 1999) (distinguishing the "natural tendency test" from a but-for test); Kross, 14 F.3d at 754 (rejecting, in a civil forfeiture case, the argument that the defendant's true testimony would not itself have justified a forfeitur

automatically mean that the question is impermissibly vague and can never form the basis of a perjury charge. See, e.g., H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 593, 607 (1958) ("A legal rule forbids you to take a vehicle into the public park. Plainly this forbids an automobile,