Epstein Secrets

uthful answer might reasonably be calculated to lead to the discovery of evidence admissible at the trial of the underlying suit." United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1994)); see United States v. Birrell, 470 F.2d 113, 115 n.1 (2d Cir. 1972) (explaining, in the context of a motion to pro

United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131, 135-36 (2d Cir. 1999) (distinguishing the "natural tendency test" from a but-for test); Kross, 14 F.3d at 754 (rejecting, in a civil forfeiture case, the argument that the defendant's true testimony would not itself have justified a forfeitur

ws in the context of child abuse prosecutions are not in conflict with constitutional notice requirements."' Young, 2008 WL 4178190, at *2 (quoting Valentine v. Konteh, 395 F.3d 626, 632 (6th Cir. 2005)). The same is true here. The minor victims in this case cannot reasonably be expected to recall the exact dates

uthful answer might reasonably be calculated to lead to the discovery of evidence admissible at the trial of the underlying suit." United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1994)); see United States v. Birrell, 470 F.2d 113, 115 n.1 (2d Cir. 1972) (explaining, in the context of a motion to pro

United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131, 135-36 (2d Cir. 1999) (distinguishing the "natural tendency test" from a but-for test); Kross, 14 F.3d at 754 (rejecting, in a civil forfeiture case, the argument that the defendant's true testimony would not itself have justified a forfeitur

ows in the context of child abuse prosecutions are not in conflict with constitutional notice requirements!" Young, 2008 WL 4178190, at *2 (quoting Valentine v. Konteh, 395 F.3d 626, 632 (6th Cir. 2005)). The same is true here. The minor victims in this case cannot reasonably be expected to recall the exact dates

uthful answer might reasonably be calculated to lead to the discovery of evidence admissible at the trial of the underlying suit." United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1994)); see United States v. Birrell, 470 F.2d 113, 115 n.1 (2d Cir. 1972) (explaining, in the context of a motion to pro

United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131, 135-36 (2d Cir. 1999) (distinguishing the "natural tendency test" from a but-for test); Kross, 14 F.3d at 754 (rejecting, in a civil forfeiture case, the argument that the defendant's true testimony would not itself have justified a forfeitur

ows in the context of child abuse prosecutions are not in conflict with constitutional notice requirements!" Young, 2008 WL 4178190, at *2 (quoting Valentine v. Konteh, 395 F.3d 626, 632 (6th Cir. 2005)). The same is true here. The minor victims in this case cannot reasonably be expected to recall the exact dates

uthful answer might reasonably be calculated to lead to the discovery of evidence admissible at the trial of the underlying suit." United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1994)); see United States v. Birrell, 470 F.2d 113, 115 n.1 (2d Cir. 1972) (explaining, in the context of a motion to pro

United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131, 135-36 (2d Cir. 1999) (distinguishing the "natural tendency test" from a but-for test); Kross, 14 F.3d at 754 (rejecting, in a civil forfeiture case, the argument that the defendant's true testimony would not itself have justified a forfeitur

ws in the context of child abuse prosecutions are not in conflict with constitutional notice requirements.'" Young, 2008 WL 4178190, at *2 (quoting Valentine v. Konteh, 395 F.3d 626, 632 (6th Cir. 2005)). The same is true here. The minor victims in this case cannot reasonably be expected to recall the exact dates

uthful answer might reasonably be calculated to lead to the discovery of evidence admissible at the trial of the underlying suit." United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1994)); see United States v. Bitrell, 470 F.2d 113, 115 n.1 (2d Cir. 1972) (explaining, in the context of a motion to pro

United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131, 135-36 (2d Cir. 1999) (distinguishing the "natural tendency test" from a but-for test); Kross, 14 F.3d at 754 (rejecting, in a civil forfeiture case, the argument that the defendant's true testimony would not itself have justified a forfeitur

ows in the context of child abuse prosecutions are not in conflict with constitutional notice requirements!" Young, 2008 WL 4178190, at *2 (quoting Valentine v. Konteh, 395 F.3d 626, 632 (6th Cir. 2005)). The same is true here. The minor victims in this case cannot reasonably be expected to recall the exact dates