Epstein Secrets

uthful answer might reasonably be calculated to lead to the discovery of evidence admissible at the trial of the underlying suit." United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1994)); see United States v. Birrell, 470 F.2d 113, 115 n.1 (2d Cir. 1972) (explaining, in the context of a motion to pro

United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131, 135-36 (2d Cir. 1999) (distinguishing the "natural tendency test" from a but-for test); Kross, 14 F.3d at 754 (rejecting, in a civil forfeiture case, the argument that the defendant's true testimony would not itself have justified a forfeitur

substitute for Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, which adequately safeguards against unlawful searches and seizures.' Lambus, 897 F.3d at 401 (quoting Ming He, 94 F.3d at 792); see also United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 737 (1980) ("the supervisory power does not extend so far" as to "confer on the j

uthful answer might reasonably be calculated to lead to the discovery of evidence admissible at the trial of the underlying suit." United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1994)); see United States v. Birrell, 470 F.2d 113, 115 n.1 (2d Cir. 1972) (explaining, in the context of a motion to pro

United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131, 135-36 (2d Cir. 1999) (distinguishing the "natural tendency test" from a but-for test); Kross, 14 F.3d at 754 (rejecting, in a civil forfeiture case, the argument that the defendant's true testimony would not itself have justified a forfeitur

substitute for Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, which adequately safeguards against unlawful searches and seizures.' Lambus, 897 F.3d at 401 (quoting Ming He, 94 F.3d at 792); see also United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 737 (1980) ("the supervisory power does not extend so far" as to "confer on the j

uthful answer might reasonably be calculated to lead to the discovery of evidence admissible at the trial of the underlying suit." United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1994)); see United States v. Birrell, 470 F.2d 113, 115 n.1 (2d Cir. 1972) (explaining, in the context of a motion to pro

United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131, 135-36 (2d Cir. 1999) (distinguishing the "natural tendency test" from a but-for test); Kross, 14 F.3d at 754 (rejecting, in a civil forfeiture case, the argument that the defendant's true testimony would not itself have justified a forfeitur

substitute for Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, which adequately safeguards against unlawful searches and seizures.' Lambus, 897 F.3d at 401 (quoting Ming He, 94 F.3d at 792); see also United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 737 (1980) ("the supervisory power does not extend so far" as to "confer on the j

uthful answer might reasonably be calculated to lead to the discovery of evidence admissible at the trial of the underlying suit." United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1994)); see United States v. Birrell, 470 F.2d 113, 115 n.1 (2d Cir. 1972) (explaining, in the context of a motion to pro

United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131, 135-36 (2d Cir. 1999) (distinguishing the "natural tendency test" from a but-for test); Kross, 14 F.3d at 754 (rejecting, in a civil forfeiture case, the argument that the defendant's true testimony would not itself have justified a forfeitur

bstitute for Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, which adequately safeguards against unlawful searches and seizures.'" Lambus, 897 F.3d at 401 (quoting Ming He, 94 F.3d at 792); see also United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 737 (1980) ("the supervisory power does not extend so far" as to "confer on the j

uthful answer might reasonably be calculated to lead to the discovery of evidence admissible at the trial of the underlying suit." United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1994)); see United States v. Bitrell, 470 F.2d 113, 115 n.1 (2d Cir. 1972) (explaining, in the context of a motion to pro

United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131, 135-36 (2d Cir. 1999) (distinguishing the "natural tendency test" from a but-for test); Kross, 14 F.3d at 754 (rejecting, in a civil forfeiture case, the argument that the defendant's true testimony would not itself have justified a forfeitur

substitute for Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, which adequately safeguards against unlawful searches and seizures.' Lambus, 897 F.3d at 401 (quoting Ming He, 94 F.3d at 792); see also United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 737 (1980) ("the supervisory power does not extend so far" as to "confer on the j