Epstein Secrets

uthful answer might reasonably be calculated to lead to the discovery of evidence admissible at the trial of the underlying suit." United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1994)); see United States v. Birrell, 470 F.2d 113, 115 n.1 (2d Cir. 1972) (explaining, in the context of a motion to pro

United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131, 135-36 (2d Cir. 1999) (distinguishing the "natural tendency test" from a but-for test); Kross, 14 F.3d at 754 (rejecting, in a civil forfeiture case, the argument that the defendant's true testimony would not itself have justified a forfeitur

31 (approving of similar precautions when introducing evidence of a defendant's prior felony conviction); Pizarro, 2018 WL 1737236, at *7; see also Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 540 ("[J]uries are presumed to follow their instructions." (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). There is every reason to

o sever defendants, rather than counts, the Supreme Court's construction of Rule 14(a) applies in either case. See Page, 657 F.3d at 129 (relying on Zafiro); United States v. Gracesqui, No. 10 Cr. 74 (PKC), 2015 WL 5231168, at *4 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept 8, 2015), afd, 730 F. App'x 25 (2d Cir. 2018) (citing

uthful answer might reasonably be calculated to lead to the discovery of evidence admissible at the trial of the underlying suit." United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1994)); see United States v. Birrell, 470 F.2d 113, 115 n.1 (2d Cir. 1972) (explaining, in the context of a motion to pro

United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131, 135-36 (2d Cir. 1999) (distinguishing the "natural tendency test" from a but-for test); Kross, 14 F.3d at 754 (rejecting, in a civil forfeiture case, the argument that the defendant's true testimony would not itself have justified a forfeitur

31 (approving of similar precautions when introducing evidence of a defendant's prior felony conviction); Pizarro, 2018 WL 1737236, at *7; see also Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 540 ("[J]uries are presumed to follow their instructions." (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). There is every reason to

o sever defendants, rather than counts, the Supreme Court's construction of Rule 14(a) applies in either case. See Page, 657 F.3d at 129 (relying on Zafiro); United States v. Gracesqui, No. 10 Cr. 74 (PKC), 2015 WL 5231168, at *4 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2015), aff'd, 730 F. App'x 25 (2d Cir. 2018) (citi

uthful answer might reasonably be calculated to lead to the discovery of evidence admissible at the trial of the underlying suit." United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1994)); see United States v. Birrell, 470 F.2d 113, 115 n.1 (2d Cir. 1972) (explaining, in the context of a motion to pro

United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131, 135-36 (2d Cir. 1999) (distinguishing the "natural tendency test" from a but-for test); Kross, 14 F.3d at 754 (rejecting, in a civil forfeiture case, the argument that the defendant's true testimony would not itself have justified a forfeitur

31 (approving of similar precautions when introducing evidence of a defendant's prior felony conviction); Pizarro, 2018 WL 1737236, at *7; see also Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 540 ("[J]uries are presumed to follow their instructions." (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). There is every reason to

o sever defendants, rather than counts, the Supreme Court's construction of Rule 14(a) applies in either case. See Page, 657 F.3d at 129 (relying on Zafiro); United States v. Gracesqui, No. 10 Cr. 74 (PKC), 2015 WL 5231168, at *4 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2015), aff'd, 730 F. App'x 25 (2d Cir. 2018) (citi

uthful answer might reasonably be calculated to lead to the discovery of evidence admissible at the trial of the underlying suit." United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1994)); see United States v. Birrell, 470 F.2d 113, 115 n.1 (2d Cir. 1972) (explaining, in the context of a motion to pro

United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131, 135-36 (2d Cir. 1999) (distinguishing the "natural tendency test" from a but-for test); Kross, 14 F.3d at 754 (rejecting, in a civil forfeiture case, the argument that the defendant's true testimony would not itself have justified a forfeitur

31 (approving of similar precautions when introducing evidence of a defendant's prior felony conviction); Pizarro, 2018 WL 1737236, at *7; see also Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 540 ("[J]uries are presumed to follow their instructions." (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). There is every reason to

o sever defendants, rather than counts, the Supreme Court's construction of Rule 14(a) applies in either case. See Page, 657 F.3d at 129 (relying on Zafiro); United States v. Gracesqui, No. 10 Cr. 74 (PKC), 2015 WL 5231168, at *4 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2015), aff'd, 730 F. App'x 25 (2d Cir. 2018) (citi

uthful answer might reasonably be calculated to lead to the discovery of evidence admissible at the trial of the underlying suit." United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1994)); see United States v. Bitrell, 470 F.2d 113, 115 n.1 (2d Cir. 1972) (explaining, in the context of a motion to pro

United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131, 135-36 (2d Cir. 1999) (distinguishing the "natural tendency test" from a but-for test); Kross, 14 F.3d at 754 (rejecting, in a civil forfeiture case, the argument that the defendant's true testimony would not itself have justified a forfeitur

31 (approving of similar precautions when introducing evidence of a defendant's prior felony conviction); Pizarro, 2018 WL 1737236, at *7; see also Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 540 ("[J]uries are presumed to follow their instructions." (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). There is every reason to

o sever defendants, rather than counts, the Supreme Court's construction of Rule 14(a) applies in either case. See Page, 657 F.3d at 129 (relying on Zafiro); United States v. Gracesqui, No. 10 Cr. 74 (PKC), 2015 WL 5231168, at *4 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2015), aff'd, 730 F. App'x 25 (2d Cir. 2018) (citi