Epstein Secrets

uthful answer might reasonably be calculated to lead to the discovery of evidence admissible at the trial of the underlying suit." United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1994)); see United States v. Birrell, 470 F.2d 113, 115 n.1 (2d Cir. 1972) (explaining, in the context of a motion to pro

United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131, 135-36 (2d Cir. 1999) (distinguishing the "natural tendency test" from a but-for test); Kross, 14 F.3d at 754 (rejecting, in a civil forfeiture case, the argument that the defendant's true testimony would not itself have justified a forfeitur

ers do not create a genuine issue as to any material fact. United States v. Carving, 968 F.2d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 1992), abrogated on other grounds by Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994. Moreover, it is well settled that a material issue of fact sufficient to justify an evidentiary 112 EFTA0010

uthful answer might reasonably be calculated to lead to the discovery of evidence admissible at the trial of the underlying suit." United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1994)); see United States v. Birrell, 470 F.2d 113, 115 n.1 (2d Cir. 1972) (explaining, in the context of a motion to pro

United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131, 135-36 (2d Cir. 1999) (distinguishing the "natural tendency test" from a but-for test); Kross, 14 F.3d at 754 (rejecting, in a civil forfeiture case, the argument that the defendant's true testimony would not itself have justified a forfeitur

ers do not create a genuine issue as to any material fact. United States v. Carving, 968 F.2d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 1992), abrogated on other grounds by Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994. Moreover, it is well settled that a material issue of fact sufficient to justify an evidentiary 112 EFTA0007

uthful answer might reasonably be calculated to lead to the discovery of evidence admissible at the trial of the underlying suit." United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1994)); see United States v. Birrell, 470 F.2d 113, 115 n.1 (2d Cir. 1972) (explaining, in the context of a motion to pro

United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131, 135-36 (2d Cir. 1999) (distinguishing the "natural tendency test" from a but-for test); Kross, 14 F.3d at 754 (rejecting, in a civil forfeiture case, the argument that the defendant's true testimony would not itself have justified a forfeitur

ers do not create a genuine issue as to any material fact. United States v. Carving, 968 F.2d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 1992), abrogated on other grounds by Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994. Moreover, it is well settled that a material issue of fact sufficient to justify an evidentiary 112 EFTA0003

v. King, 560 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1977) 44 United States v. Kozel, 19 Cr. 460 (KMW), 2020 WL 4751498 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2020) 155 United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751 (2d Cir. 1994) 122, 148 United States v. LaFlam, 369 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 2004) 166 United States v. Lahey, 967 F. Supp. 2d 698 (S.D

agrees that it will not institute any criminal charges against any potential co-conspirators of Epstein, including but not limited to Sarah Kellen, Adriana Ross, Lesley Groff, or Nadia Marcinkova. NPA at 5; Def. Mot. 1 at 20-21. Aside from the reference to "United States" which, as noted above, is insuffic

779 F.2d 861 (2d Cir. 1985) 77, 80, 81 Peck v. United States, 73 F.3d 1220 (2d Cir. 1995) 112 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) 82, 83 Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994) 112 vii EFTA00095074 Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980) 83 Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (1

uthful answer might reasonably be calculated to lead to the discovery of evidence admissible at the trial of the underlying suit." United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1994)); see United States v. Birrell, 470 F.2d 113, 115 n.1 (2d Cir. 1972) (explaining, in the context of a motion to pro

United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131, 135-36 (2d Cir. 1999) (distinguishing the "natural tendency test" from a but-for test); Kross, 14 F.3d at 754 (rejecting, in a civil forfeiture case, the argument that the defendant's true testimony would not itself have justified a forfeitur

ers do not create a genuine issue as to any material fact. United States v. Carving, 968 F.2d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 1992), abrogated on other grounds by Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994), Peck v. United States, 73 F.3d 1220 (2d Cir. 1995). Moreover, it is well settled that a material issue of fa

uthful answer might reasonably be calculated to lead to the discovery of evidence admissible at the trial of the underlying suit." United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1994)); see United States v. Bitrell, 470 F.2d 113, 115 n.1 (2d Cir. 1972) (explaining, in the context of a motion to pro

United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131, 135-36 (2d Cir. 1999) (distinguishing the "natural tendency test" from a but-for test); Kross, 14 F.3d at 754 (rejecting, in a civil forfeiture case, the argument that the defendant's true testimony would not itself have justified a forfeitur

ers do not create a genuine issue as to any material fact. United States v. Carving, 968 F.2d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 1992), abrogated on other grounds by Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994. Moreover, it is well settled that a material issue of fact sufficient to justify an evidentiary 112 EFTA0010