Epstein Secrets

truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offense and thus ordinarily must be "decided by the jury

axwell's answers could have led to the discovery of other evidence or could influence the factfinder in the civil case. See Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 509; Kross, 14 F.3d at 753-54. At trial, a reasonable juror could conclude that truthful answers to the questions may have permitted the plaintiff to locate o

cific timing, but assuming a schedule along those lines is met, the Court concludes that Maxwell will be able to effectively prepare for trial. See Coppa, 267 F.3d at 144. B. Jencks Act material and co-conspirator statements Maxwell also seeks to expedite discovery of Jencks Act material and non-excu

atements are covered by the Jencks Act, the Court cannot compel production of such statements under the terms of the statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500; Coppa, 267 F.3d at 145. Next, the Government represents that it has already produced an unredacted copy of the other requested FBI report, and so that re

truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offense and thus ordinarily must be "decided by the jury

axwell's answers could have led to the discovery of other evidence or could influence the factfinder in the civil case. See Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 509; Kross, 14 F.3d at 753-54. At trial, a reasonable juror could conclude that truthful answers to the questions may have permitted the plaintiff to locate o

cific timing, but assuming a schedule along those lines is met, the Court concludes that Maxwell will be able to effectively prepare for trial. See Coppa, 267 F.3d at 144. B. Jencks Act material and co-conspirator statements Maxwell also seeks to expedite discovery of Jencks Act material and non-excu

atements are covered by the Jencks Act, the Court cannot compel production of such statements under the terms of the statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500; Coppa, 267 F.3d at 145. Next, the Government represents that it has already produced an unredacted copy of the other requested FBI report, and so that re

truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offense and thus ordinarily must be "decided by the jury

axwell's answers could have led to the discovery of other evidence or could influence the factfinder in the civil case. See Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 509; Kross, 14 F.3d at 753-54. At trial, a reasonable juror could conclude that truthful answers to the questions may have permitted the plaintiff to locate o

cific timing, but assuming a schedule along those lines is met, the Court concludes that Maxwell will be able to effectively prepare for trial. See Coppa, 267 F.3d at 144. B. Jencks Act material and co-conspirator statements Maxwell also seeks to expedite discovery of Jencks Act material and non-excu

atements are covered by the Jencks Act, the Court cannot compel production of such statements under the terms of the statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500; Coppa, 267 F.3d at 145. Next, the Government represents that it has already produced an unredacted copy of the other requested FBI report, and so that re

truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offense and thus ordinarily must be "decided by the jury

axwell's answers could have led to the discovery of other evidence or could influence the factfinder in the civil case. See Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 509; Kross, 14 F.3d at 753-54. At trial, a reasonable juror could conclude that truthful answers to the questions may have permitted the plaintiff to locate o

cific timing, but assuming a schedule along those lines is met, the Court concludes that Maxwell will be able to effectively prepare for trial. See Coppa, 267 F.3d at 144. B. Jencks Act material and co-conspirator statements Maxwell also seeks to expedite discovery of Jencks Act material and non-excu

atements are covered by the Jencks Act, the Court cannot compel production of such statements under the terms of the statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500; Coppa, 267 F.3d at 145. Next, the Government represents that it has already produced an unredacted copy of the other requested FBI report, and so that re

truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offense and thus ordinarily must be "decided by the jury

axwell's answers could have led to the discovery of other evidence or could influence the factfinder in the civil case. See Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 509; Kross, 14 F.3d at 753-54. At trial, a reasonable juror could conclude that truthful answers to the questions may have permitted the plaintiff to locate o

cific timing, but assuming a schedule along those lines is met, the Court concludes that Maxwell will be able to effectively prepare for trial. See Coppa, 267 F.3d at 144. B. Jencks Act material and co-conspirator statements Maxwell also seeks to expedite discovery of Jencks Act material and non-excu

atements are covered by the Jencks Act, the Court cannot compel production of such statements under the terms of the statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500; Coppa, 267 F.3d at 145. Next, the Government represents that it has already produced an unredacted copy of the other requested FBI report, and so that re

truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offense and thus ordinarily must be "decided by the jury

axwell's answers could have led to the discovery of other evidence or could influence the factfinder in the civil case. See Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 509; Kross, 14 F.3d at 753-54. At trial, a reasonable juror could conclude that truthful answers to the questions may have permitted the plaintiff to locate o

cific timing, but assuming a schedule along those lines is met, the Court concludes that Maxwell will be able to effectively prepare for trial. See Coppa, 267 F.3d at 144. B. Jencks Act material and co-conspirator statements Maxwell also seeks to expedite discovery of Jencks Act material and non-excu

atements are covered by the Jencks Act, the Court cannot compel production of such statements under the terms of the statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500; Coppa, 267 F.3d at 145. Next, the Government represents that it has already produced an unredacted copy of the other requested FBI report, and so that re

truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offense and thus ordinarily must be "decided by the jury

axwell's answers could have led to the discovery of other evidence or could influence the factfinder in the civil case. See Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 509; Kross, 14 F.3d at 753-54. At trial, a reasonable juror could conclude that truthful answers to the questions may have permitted the plaintiff to locate o

cific timing, but assuming a schedule along those lines is met, the Court concludes that Maxwell will be able to effectively prepare for trial. See Coppa, 267 F.3d at 144. B. Jencks Act material and co-conspirator statements Maxwell also seeks to expedite discovery of Jencks Act material and non-excu

atements are covered by the Jencks Act, the Court cannot compel production of such statements under the terms of the statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500; Coppa, 267 F.3d at 145. Next, the Government represents that it has already produced an unredacted copy of the other requested FBI report, and so that re

truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offense and thus ordinarily must be "decided by the jury

axwell's answers could have led to the discovery of other evidence or could influence the factfinder in the civil case. See Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 509; Kross, 14 F.3d at 753-54. At trial, a reasonable juror could conclude that truthful answers to the questions may have permitted the plaintiff to locate o

cific timing, but assuming a schedule along those lines is met, the Court concludes that Maxwell will be able to effectively prepare for trial. See Coppa, 267 F.3d at 144. B. Jencks Act material and co-conspirator statements Maxwell also seeks to expedite discovery of Jencks Act material and non-excu

atements are covered by the Jencks Act, the Court cannot compel production of such statements under the terms of the statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500; Coppa, 267 F.3d at 145. Next, the Government represents that it has already produced an unredacted copy of the other requested FBI report, and so that re

truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offense and thus ordinarily must be "decided by the jury

axwell's answers could have led to the discovery of other evidence or could influence the factfinder in the civil case. See Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 509; Kross, 14 F.3d at 753-54. At trial, a reasonable juror could conclude that truthful answers to the questions may have permitted the plaintiff to locate o

cific timing, but assuming a schedule along those lines is met, the Court concludes that Maxwell will be able to effectively prepare for trial. See Coppa, 267 F.3d at 144. B. Jencks Act material and co-conspirator statements Maxwell also seeks to expedite discovery of Jencks Act material and non-excu

atements are covered by the Jencks Act, the Court cannot compel production of such statements under the terms of the statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500; Coppa, 267 F.3d at 145. Next, the Government represents that it has already produced an unredacted copy of the other requested FBI report, and so that re

truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offense and thus ordinarily must be "decided by the jury

axwell's answers could have led to the discovery of other evidence or could influence the factfinder in the civil case. See Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 509; Kross, 14 F.3d at 753-54. At trial, a reasonable juror could conclude that truthful answers to the questions may have permitted the plaintiff to locate o

cific timing, but assuming a schedule along those lines is met, the Court concludes that Maxwell will be able to effectively prepare for trial. See Coppa, 267 F.3d at 144. B. Jencks Act material and co-conspirator statements Maxwell also seeks to expedite discovery of Jencks Act material and non-excu

atements are covered by the Jencks Act, the Court cannot compel production of such statements under the terms of the statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500; Coppa, 267 F.3d at 145. Next, the Government represents that it has already produced an unredacted copy of the other requested FBI report, and so that re