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truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offense and thus ordinarily must be "decided by the jury
axwell's answers could have led to the discovery of other evidence or could influence the factfinder in the civil case. See Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 509; Kross, 14 F.3d at 753-54. At trial, a reasonable juror could conclude that truthful answers to the questions may have permitted the plaintiff to locate o
he civil case have worked with her for years and are particularly familiar with the facts surrounding the criminal prosecution. See United States v. Cunningham, 672 F.2d 1064, 1070-71 (2d Cir. 1982). The Court is of course cognizant of the burden separate trials may impose on all trial participants. But m
truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offense and thus ordinarily must be "decided by the jury
axwell's answers could have led to the discovery of other evidence or could influence the factfinder in the civil case. See Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 509; Kross, 14 F.3d at 753-54. At trial, a reasonable juror could conclude that truthful answers to the questions may have permitted the plaintiff to locate o
he civil case have worked with her for years and are particularly familiar with the facts surrounding the criminal prosecution. See United States v. Cunningham, 672 F.2d 1064, 1070-71 (2d Cir. 1982). The Court is of course cognizant of the burden separate trials may impose on all trial participants. But m
truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offense and thus ordinarily must be "decided by the jury
axwell's answers could have led to the discovery of other evidence or could influence the factfinder in the civil case. See Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 509; Kross, 14 F.3d at 753-54. At trial, a reasonable juror could conclude that truthful answers to the questions may have permitted the plaintiff to locate o
he civil case have worked with her for years and are particularly familiar with the facts surrounding the criminal prosecution. See United States v. Cunningham, 672 F.2d 1064, 1070-71 (2d Cir. 1982). The Court is of course cognizant of the burden separate trials may impose on all trial participants. But m
truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offense and thus ordinarily must be "decided by the jury
axwell's answers could have led to the discovery of other evidence or could influence the factfinder in the civil case. See Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 509; Kross, 14 F.3d at 753-54. At trial, a reasonable juror could conclude that truthful answers to the questions may have permitted the plaintiff to locate o
he civil case have worked with her for years and are particularly familiar with the facts surrounding the criminal prosecution. See United States v. Cunningham, 672 F.2d 1064, 1070-71 (2d Cir. 1982). The Court is of course cognizant of the burden separate trials may impose on all trial participants. But m
truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offense and thus ordinarily must be "decided by the jury
axwell's answers could have led to the discovery of other evidence or could influence the factfinder in the civil case. See Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 509; Kross, 14 F.3d at 753-54. At trial, a reasonable juror could conclude that truthful answers to the questions may have permitted the plaintiff to locate o
he civil case have worked with her for years and are particularly familiar with the facts surrounding the criminal prosecution. See United States v. Cunningham, 672 F.2d 1064, 1070-71 (2d Cir. 1982). The Court is of course cognizant of the burden separate trials may impose on all trial participants. But m
truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offense and thus ordinarily must be "decided by the jury
axwell's answers could have led to the discovery of other evidence or could influence the factfinder in the civil case. See Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 509; Kross, 14 F.3d at 753-54. At trial, a reasonable juror could conclude that truthful answers to the questions may have permitted the plaintiff to locate o
he civil case have worked with her for years and are particularly familiar with the facts surrounding the criminal prosecution. See United States v. Cunningham, 672 F.2d 1064, 1070-71 (2d Cir. 1982). The Court is of course cognizant of the burden separate trials may impose on all trial participants. But m
truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offense and thus ordinarily must be "decided by the jury
axwell's answers could have led to the discovery of other evidence or could influence the factfinder in the civil case. See Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 509; Kross, 14 F.3d at 753-54. At trial, a reasonable juror could conclude that truthful answers to the questions may have permitted the plaintiff to locate o
he civil case have worked with her for years and are particularly familiar with the facts surrounding the criminal prosecution. See United States v. Cunningham, 672 F.2d 1064, 1070-71 (2d Cir. 1982). The Court is of course cognizant of the burden separate trials may impose on all trial participants. But m
truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offense and thus ordinarily must be "decided by the jury
axwell's answers could have led to the discovery of other evidence or could influence the factfinder in the civil case. See Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 509; Kross, 14 F.3d at 753-54. At trial, a reasonable juror could conclude that truthful answers to the questions may have permitted the plaintiff to locate o
he civil case have worked with her for years and are particularly familiar with the facts surrounding the criminal prosecution. See United States v. Cunningham, 672 F.2d 1064, 1070-71 (2d Cir. 1982). The Court is of course cognizant of the burden separate trials may impose on all trial participants. But m
truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offense and thus ordinarily must be "decided by the jury
axwell's answers could have led to the discovery of other evidence or could influence the factfinder in the civil case. See Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 509; Kross, 14 F.3d at 753-54. At trial, a reasonable juror could conclude that truthful answers to the questions may have permitted the plaintiff to locate o
he civil case have worked with her for years and are particularly familiar with the facts surrounding the criminal prosecution. See United States v. Cunningham, 672 F.2d 1064, 1070-71 (2d Cir. 1982). The Court is of course cognizant of the burden separate trials may impose on all trial participants. But m
truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offense and thus ordinarily must be "decided by the jury
axwell's answers could have led to the discovery of other evidence or could influence the factfinder in the civil case. See Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 509; Kross, 14 F.3d at 753-54. At trial, a reasonable juror could conclude that truthful answers to the questions may have permitted the plaintiff to locate o
he civil case have worked with her for years and are particularly familiar with the facts surrounding the criminal prosecution. See United States v. Cunningham, 672 F.2d 1064, 1070-71 (2d Cir. 1982). The Court is of course cognizant of the burden separate trials may impose on all trial participants. But m
Entities connected to both Adriana Ross and Cunningham

Jeffrey Epstein
PERSON
Ghislaine Maxwell
PERSON
United States
LOCATION
George W. Bush
PERSONLeon Black
PERSONFBI
ORGANIZATION
Prince Andrew
PERSON
Wilbur Ross
PERSONthe Southern District
LOCATION
Department of Justice
ORGANIZATION
Lesley Groff
PERSON
Donald Trump
PERSON
Scarlett Johansson
PERSON
Julie K. Brown
PERSONEmmy Taylor
PERSON
Virginia Giuffre
PERSON
Bradley Edwards
PERSON
Alan Dershowitz
PERSON
Stephen Hawking
PERSONNadia Marcinkova
PERSON