Epstein Secrets

d explaining how insufficient data limits the effectiveness of reform efforts). On the prospect of reduced federal commitment to this strategy in the Trump administration, see U.S. Attorney Gen., supra note 24; Horwitz et al., supra note 24. 197 See Dripps, supra note 149, at 19 & n.100 (citing five fed

attorneys hold elective offices; if their constituents are unsatisfied, they are free to express their feelings at the voting polls."); cf. Chenev v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 386 (2004) ("The decision to prosecute a criminal case ... is made by a publicly accountable prosecutor."). For discussion of this poi

d go without saying that nothing in the Rules can trump a substantive statute passed by Congress. See 28

in [the CVRA] was agreed to."). °! 150 Cong. Rec. H8208-09 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 2004). °2 150 Cong. Rec. $10910 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004). % Kenna v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 435 F.3d 1011, 1015-16 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotations and citations omitted); accord United States v. Sharp, 463 F

s can modify substantive rights, °° the CVRA will trump any conflicting provision in the federal rules. °

the National Crime Victims Law Institute and other legal clinics for victims). w 8 See Gillis & Beloof, supra note 314, at 692. 319 See Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 307 & n.8 (1989) (leaving open the question of whether federal courts possess the inherent authority to require counsel to provide leg