Epstein Secrets

istinction—permitting cross-examination on drug use but excluding a formal diagnosis of addiction—in several cases. E.g., DiPaolo, 804 F.2d at 230; Dobson v. Walker, 150 F. App'x 49,52 (2d Cir. 2005) (explaining that cross- examination about a witness's drug use before witnessing a murder would be admissible, but

pend on Alleged Victim 4's response to that question, whether any prior statement is actually "inconsistent" with her response, see United States v. Trzaska, 111 F.3d 1019,1024-25 (2d Cir. 1997) (reversing a district court's admission of prior statements that were not inconsistent), and whether the Defe

istinction—permitting cross-examination on drug use but excluding a formal diagnosis of addiction—in several cases. E.g., DiPaolo, 804 F.2d at 230; Dobson v. Walker, 150 F. App'x 49,52 (2d Cir. 2005) (explaining that cross- examination about a witness's drug use before witnessing a murder would be admissible, but

pend on Alleged Victim 4's response to that question, whether any prior statement is actually "inconsistent" with her response, see United States v. Trzaska, 111 F.3d 1019,1024-25 (2d Cir. 1997) (reversing a district court's admission of prior statements that were not inconsistent), and whether the Defe

uch a distinction—permitting cross-examination on drug use but excluding a formal diagnosis ofilM—in several cases. E.g., DiPaolo, 804 F.2d at 230; Dobson v. Walker, 150 F. App'x 49,52 (2d Cir. 2005) (explaining that cross- examination about a witness's drug use before witnessing a murder would be admissible, but

pend on Alleged Victim 4's response to that question, whether any prior statement is actually "inconsistent" with her response, see United States v. Trzaska, 111 F.3d 1019,1024-25 (2d Cir. 1997) (reversing a district court's admission of prior statements that were not inconsistent), and whether the Defe