Epstein Secrets

ew as well. As we progressed with our testing and development of the program, others were involved to include the Office of General Counsel (OGC), the General Counsel himself, the Procurement Office, several ACsl, the NYFO ADIC, and various other leaders in FBI management. At a minimum, my squad SSA, branch ASA

orked through an emergency in which Boston Field Office had a hands-on offender and they needed to preserve their chat information. I worked with OGC GA Christopher Dearing on PIP. revisions. I was delayed getting back to him due to a trial. Once I got back to him, the cyber intrusion of the C-20 co

d I exceed my authority by contracting an outside company. There was no contract. My chain of command, including our CDC and later OGC, to include the General Counsel himself, knew I was speaking with Apostlex and creating a solution to a problem. I c..1,,,-.1-ngaged in the Commented (CT7J: I did not highlight Mi

eded to preserve their chat information. Despite initially receiving support, emergency use authority was never granted in that case. I worked with OGC GA Christopher Dearing on PTA revisions. I was delayed getting back to him due to a trial. Once I got back to him, the cyber intrusion of the C-20 com

were others in the office who knew as well. As we progressed with our testing and development of the program, others were involved to include OGC, the General Counsel himself, the Procurement Office, several SACs, the NYFO ADIC, and various other leaders in FBI management. At a minimum, my squad SSA, branch ASAC

eded to preserve their chat information. Despite initially receiving support, emergency use authority was never granted in that case. I worked with OGC GA Christopher Dearing on PTA revisions. I was delayed getting back to him due to a trial. Once I got back to him, the cyber intrusion of the C-20 com