Epstein Secrets

ion is reviewable on appeal' and the availability of other remedies through which the trial court could mitigate the harm. . ." Id. at 1215 (citing Fridovich, 598 So. 2d at 69). Accordingly, the DelMonico decision affirmatively recognized a litigation privilege where, as in the instant case, there is jud

116 So. 3d 1205 (Fla. 2013) 2, 10, 18, 19 Echevarria, McCalla, Raymer, Barren & Frappier v. Cole, 950 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 2007) passim Fridovich v. Fridovich, 598 So. 2d 65 (FIa. 1992) 13, 17, 22 Graham-Eckes Palm Beach Academy v. Johnson, 573 So. 2d 1007 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991) 21 Jackson v. Attorney's

njoys the same immunity. We agree." Id. at 427. Appellant's reliance on Fridovich v. Fridovich, 598 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1992) is also erroneous, as in Fridovich the Florida Supreme Court specifically concluded that only a qualified privilege is applicable when private individuals voluntarily make defamatory

So. 2d 356 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) 17, 22 Pardo v. State, 596 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 1996) 12 Procacci v. Zacco, 402 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981) 21 R.H. Ciccone Properties, Ina v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 141 So. 3d 590 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) 15 Rivernider v. Meyer, Case Number 4D14-819 10 SCI Funeral Services of

d 1054, 1056 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). See also Montejo v. Martin Memorial Medical Center, Inc., 935 So. 2d 1266, 1269 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006); Fridovich v. Fridovich, 598 So. 2d 65 (Ha. 1992) (stating that the litigation privilege "arises immediately upon the doing of any act required or permitted by law in the

ion is reviewable on appeal' and the availability of other remedies through which the trial court could mitigate the harm. . ." Id. at 1215 (citing Fridovich, 598 So. 2d at 69). Accordingly, the DelMonico decision affirmatively recognized a litigation privilege where, as in the instant case, there is jud

njoys the same immunity. We agree." Id. at 427. Appellant's reliance on Fridovich v. Fridovich, 598 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1992) is also erroneous, as in Fridovich the Florida Supreme Court specifically concluded that only a qualified privilege is applicable when private individuals voluntarily make defamatory

ements made during the course of a judicial proceeding extends not only to the parties, but to judges, witnesses and counsel as well.") In fact, in R.H. Ciccone Properties, Inc. v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 141 So. 3d 590 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014), this Court correctly recognized that "'[t]he purpose of the litigation pri

accusing Olson of stalking. And 8 the court distinguished that claim privilege from 9 a defamation case that was addressed in a case 10 called Fridovich vs. Fridovich, 598 So2d. 65, 11 Florida Supreme Court case 1992, in which the 12 Supreme Court was presented with a certified 13 question of wh

n of stalking. And 8 the court distinguished that claim privilege from 9 a defamation case that was addressed in a case 10 called Fridovich vs. Fridovich, 598 So2d. 65, 11 Florida Supreme Court case 1992, in which the 12 Supreme Court was presented with a certified 13 question of whether a person

So. 2d 356 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) 17, 22 Pardo v. State, 596 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 1996) 12 Procacci v. Zacco, 402 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981) 21 R.H. Ciccone Properties, Ina v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 141 So. 3d 590 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) 15 Rivernider v. Meyer, Case Number 4D14-819 10 SCI Funeral Services of