Epstein Secrets

ralized Control Center. Access into the SHU was further controlled by a second locked door (Main Interior Entry Door), to which a limited number of Correctional Officers (CO) had keys while on duty. Secondary access to the SHU was controlled by a locked door. That door was opened remotely by a staff member in the centra

a speaker phone while being monitored by a staff member, and the call should have been logged and a record of the call should have been created. The Northeast Regional Director said Epstein's unmonitored telephone call was extremely concerning because "[w]e don't know 60 EFTA00039091 what happened on that phone

alized Control Center. Access into the SHU was further controlled by a second locked door (Main Interior Entry Door), to which a limited number of Correctional Officers (CO) had keys while on duty. Secondary access to the SHU was controlled by a locked door. That door was opened remotely by a staff member in the centr

speaker phone while being monitored by a staff member, and the call should have been logged and a record of the call should have been created. The Northeast Regional Director said Epstein’s unmonitored telephone call was extremely concerning because “[w]e don’t know 61 what happened on that phone call. I

ralized Control Center. Access into the SHU was further controlled by a second locked door (Main Interior Entry Door), to which a limited number of Correctional Officers (CO) had keys while on duty. Secondary access to the SHU was controlled by a locked door. That door was opened remotely by a staff member in the centra

a speaker phone while being monitored by a staff member, and the call should have been logged and a record of the call should have been created. The Northeast Regional Director said Epstein's unmonitored telephone call was extremely concerning because "[w]e don't know 60 EFTA01656774 what happened on that phone