Epstein Secrets

ralized Control Center. Access into the SHU was further controlled by a second locked door (Main Interior Entry Door), to which a limited number of Correctional Officers (CO) had keys while on duty. Secondary access to the SHU was controlled by a locked door. That door was opened remotely by a staff member in the centra

't do the rounds. We messed up." The Lieutenant took over administering CPR and asked SHU staff to retrieve an AED and call for the duty nurse. The MCC New York Electronics Technician told the OIG that he responded to the emergency call at 6:33 a.m. When the Electronics Technician first arrived in the SHU, Thomas and other MCC New

alized Control Center. Access into the SHU was further controlled by a second locked door (Main Interior Entry Door), to which a limited number of Correctional Officers (CO) had keys while on duty. Secondary access to the SHU was controlled by a locked door. That door was opened remotely by a staff member in the centr

do the rounds. We messed up.” The Lieutenant took over administering CPR and asked SHU staff to retrieve an AED and call for the duty nurse. The MCC New York Electronics Technician told the OIG that he responded to the emergency call at 6:33 a.m. When the Electronics Technician first arrived in the SHU, Thomas and other MCC Ne

ralized Control Center. Access into the SHU was further controlled by a second locked door (Main Interior Entry Door), to which a limited number of Correctional Officers (CO) had keys while on duty. Secondary access to the SHU was controlled by a locked door. That door was opened remotely by a staff member in the centra

't do the rounds. We messed up." The Lieutenant took over administering CPR and asked SHU staff to retrieve an AED and call for the duty nurse. The MCC New York Electronics Technician told the OIG that he responded to the emergency call at 6:33 a.m. When the Electronics Technician first arrived in the SHU, Thomas and other MCC New