Epstein Secrets

ralized Control Center. Access into the SHU was further controlled by a second locked door (Main Interior Entry Door), to which a limited number of Correctional Officers (CO) had keys while on duty. Secondary access to the SHU was controlled by a locked door. That door was opened remotely by a staff member in the centra

16 that MCC New York staff members knew of Epstein's cellmate requirement because it was discussed during staff meetings, department head meetings, SHU meetings, morning meetings, and during required staff training. Forensic Psychologist 1 told the 016 that on August 9, 2019, she was present during a meetin

alized Control Center. Access into the SHU was further controlled by a second locked door (Main Interior Entry Door), to which a limited number of Correctional Officers (CO) had keys while on duty. Secondary access to the SHU was controlled by a locked door. That door was opened remotely by a staff member in the centr

IG that MCC New York staff members knew of Epstein’s cellmate requirement because it was discussed during staff meetings, department head meetings, SHU meetings, morning meetings, and during required staff training. Forensic Psychologist 1 told the OIG that on August 9, 2019, she was present during a meetin

ralized Control Center. Access into the SHU was further controlled by a second locked door (Main Interior Entry Door), to which a limited number of Correctional Officers (CO) had keys while on duty. Secondary access to the SHU was controlled by a locked door. That door was opened remotely by a staff member in the centra

16 that MCC New York staff members knew of Epstein's cellmate requirement because it was discussed during staff meetings, department head meetings, SHU meetings, morning meetings, and during required staff training. Forensic Psychologist 1 told the 016 that on August 9, 2019, she was present during a meetin